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ABSTRACT     
We study the location-specific component in research productivity of economics and 
finance faculty who have ever been affiliated with the top 25 universities in the last three 
decades. We find that there was a positive effect of being affiliated with an elite 
university in the 1970s; this effect weakened in the 1980s and disappeared in the 1990s. 
We decompose this university fixed effect and find that its decline is due to the reduced 
importance of physical access to productive research colleagues. We also find that 
salaries increased the most where the estimated externality dropped the most, consistent 
with the hypothesis that the de-localization of this externality makes it more difficult for 
universities to appropriate any rent. Our results shed some light on the potential effects of 
the internet revolution on knowledge-based industries. 
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During the internet boom in the 1990s the possibility that traditional teaching would be 
replaced with Web-based classrooms was considered a sufficiently serious threat that 
most major universities devised an “internet strategy”. Ten years later, much of this 
debate has subsided and traditional classroom teaching is expected to continue its 
dominance in the foreseeable future.  
Surprisingly, a similar debate has not taken place about how the internet could 
modify the other production process taking place in universities: namely, research. A 
compelling case can be made that the internet and the concomitant decline in 
communication costs have changed the localized nature of research interaction.  While 
collaboration across universities was common before the advent of the internet, local 
interaction was very important. Communication at a distance was costly, both from a 
monetary and a technical point of view. Large datasets, for instance, were hard to move 
from computer to computer, and it was extremely tedious to share regression results at a 
distance. All this, of course, has changed. How did these changes modify the nature of 
the production of academic research? Did local interaction become less important? If so, 
how does this decline affect the value added of elite universities and hence their 
competitive edge? These questions are important not only for academia but also for all 
knowledge-based production. How has the internet, for instance, modified the 
competitive advantage of Silicon Valley in the software industry?  
This paper attempts to answer these questions by examining research productivity 
in top economics and finance departments over the last three decades.  Using the 
academic setting has several advantages. Individual output is measurable (number of 
pages published in academic journals), and it is possible, while labor intensive, to trace 
who is where over a long period. These conditions allow us to determine whether 
location plays a role in individual productivity in a knowledge-based industry. We do so 
by tracing people’s moves across universities. 
We find that in the 1970s, residence in an elite university had a sizeable impact on 
individual productivity. During that time, a random economic faculty member moving 
from a non-top 25 university to Harvard would see her productivity increase by 2.1 
American Economic Review (AER) impact-equivalent pages per year, which is 
tantamount to almost doubling her research productivity. In the 1990s this effect all but 
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disappeared. And the disappearance is not just a Harvard phenomenon. Of the top 25 
economics departments studied, 17 (5) had a significantly positive (negative) impact on 
productivity in the 1970s. By the 1990s only 2 (9) had a significantly positive (negative) 
effect. The corresponding numbers for finance are 16 (3) and 4 (7).  
These results do not seem to stem from endogenous selection inherent in location 
decisions. We carefully consider four selection stories -- quasi-retirement, non-
promotion, complementarities, and tournaments. The patterns of post-move changes in 
productivity do not support any of these selection stories. Nevertheless, we formally 
address possible selection bias in faculty moves by estimating a two-stage selection 
model. We use a logit model to estimate the probability of moving as a function of age, 
and a conditional logit model to estimate the probability of being at each location (given 
a move) as a function of the desirability of each location for individual faculty. The 
desirability is captured by the distance to the individual’s origin (defined as the location 
of the alma mater undergraduate university), and the relative productivity difference to 
incumbent faculty. Using the predicted unconditional probability of being at a location as 
an instrument for the university indicators, the results remain materially the same. 
The declining university effects on productivity over the last three decades may 
not be necessarily due to advances in information technology. A simpler explanation is 
that other universities are catching up, in terms of quality of the faculty, to the top 
academic universities. Our data tell a different story; the difference in average individual 
faculty productivity between the top 25 universities and the rest has increased (not 
decreased) in the last three decades.  
Another possible explanation is that a sudden shift in the production frontier 
created a first mover advantage in the 1970s, which slowly eroded in the subsequent two 
decades. While this explanation is plausible for finance, which really took off as a 
separate field in the 1960s, this cannot be true for economics because it was a well-
established discipline four decades ago.  
 Rejecting these alternatives, we test some implications of the internet-based 
explanation. The most direct implication is that the externality of having better research 
colleagues declined over the sample period. Indeed, this is what we find. We measure 
colleagues’ quality with their average past productivity. In the 1970s, faculty who work 
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with better colleagues are more productive, consistent with Laband and Tollison (2000). 
This effect diminishes in the 1980s and vanishes in the 1990s. In contrast, the role of 
cultural norms in a department, as measured by the percentage of non-productive 
colleagues in a department, retains a persistent negative effect on the university’s impact 
on individual productivity.  
We find that during the same period co-authorship at a distance rises steadily 
perhaps due to the reduced importance of physical proximity. Among all articles 
published in the top 41 journals written by scholars residing at a top 25 school, the 
percentage of co-authored papers with colleagues in a non-elite school has nearly 
doubled, from about 32% in the beginning of the 1970s to 61% by 2004, suggesting that 
it has become much easier for authors at non-elite universities to access scholars at elite 
universities.  
The de-localization of the externality produced by more productive researchers 
has important implications in academia. First, it makes the position of leading universities 
less stable. While in the 1970s it was difficult for less prestigious universities to compete 
on an equal footing with top institutions, which were able to offer to new recruits the 
positive externality associated with productive colleagues, this is not true anymore. De-
localization of production externalities renders faculty more mobile, making it easier for 
a new place to attract away the most talented researchers with higher salary. And this is 
the second important effect. When this externality was localized, universities could more 
easily appropriate the rents. Today, with the universal access to knowledge, faculty 
should be able to capture more of the benefits from the externalities. We find evidence 
consistent with this prediction in the average salaries at different institutions: Between the 
1970s and the 1990s, faculty salaries have increased the most at universities where the 
estimated externality drops the most.   
These results have important implications outside of academia as well. 
Traditionally, physical access to the firm was important for knowledge-based production. 
If – as the faculty productivity data seem to show – improvements in communication 
technology have made low-cost access at a distance possible for production purposes, 
then firms have lost a powerful instrument to regulate and control the accumulation and 
utilization of knowledge. Appropriating the return to investment in research and 
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development will become more difficult and firms’ boundaries will become fuzzier. The 
implications extend far beyond what we document here. A firm’s inability to contain 
externalities inside the firm may shift the foci of migration to a more dispersed paradigm 
and may extend the role of outsourcing well beyond what we experience today. 
Governments may be compelled to react to the changing meaning of proximity and of 
firm boundaries through regulatory changes on matters concerning labor, competition, 
and industry.  
Our work is most closely related to Laband and Tollison (2000), Rosenblat and 
Mobius (2004) and Goyal, Van Der Leij, and Moraga (2006), who study the role of 
collaboration, communication, and networks among faculty in research production. 
Rosenblat and Mobius (2004) offer a theoretical framework in which low communication 
costs not only make it easier for people to work together at a distance but also cause 
splintering into work groups aligned along social lines. Along a similar line, Goyal et al. 
(2006) find that as decreased communication costs facilitate distant working 
relationships, the entire network of economists has become more interconnected. Laband 
and Tollison (2000) also find that co-authorship in economics is growing rapidly, but the 
formal collaboration (co-authoring) is not replacing the growing role of informal 
intellectual feedback on article preparation. In part, Laband and Tollison’s result may 
reflect the need and opportunity for feedback due to the slowdown in the publication 
process documented by Ellison (2002). The notion that decreasing communication costs 
have opened vaster research networks is consistent with our findings of declining 
university fixed effects and increasing co-authorship between faculty at elite and non-
elite universities. 
 The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section I presents the data. Section II 
reports estimation of the university fixed effects, followed by an examination of potential 
selection biases influencing the results in Section III. Section IV decomposes university 
fixed effects onto institution-wide characteristics and relates the changes in university 






To study the effect of location on research productivity, we collect data on individual 
research productivity for a large panel of faculty.  Special care is exercised to ensure that 
we identify the location of faculty during the production of articles, not at the publication 
date. Additionally, we cautiously choose measures of productivity that are comparable 
over three decades. 
 
A. Faculty sample selection 
Because it is difficult to collect career information for all academic fields, we 
restrict our attention to years 1970-2001 and to the fields of economics and finance, 
which, not coincidently, are the areas of the authors’ expertise. Since location-specific 
effects are likely to be strongest among top universities, our analysis is focused on top 
research institutions. We collect data on research productivity for all individuals who 
have ever been affiliated (tenure track or visiting) with top 25 universities.  
To choose the top 25 universities, we average university research rankings 
provided by eleven previous studies. These studies employ a broad range of 
methodologies and journals to rank departments over 1970-2001 sub-periods. Relying on 
these studies alleviates some of the subjectivity inherent in using a single ranking 
methodology. Table 1, panel A lists the sub-periods covered and the methodologies used 
by the eleven studies.   
Using the Borda Count (de Borda, 1781) method to average the rankings from the 
eleven studies, a university that is ranked first in a study is given 20 points; the second 
ranked university is allocated 19 points, and so on. We then average the rankings, 
individually for finance and economics, weighting each study’s allocated points by the 
number of years covered by the study. The scores for finance and economics are 
averaged (with equal weighting) for each university. The average reported in Table 1, 
panel B, shows a natural break point in score magnitude at the twenty-fifth university.1 
                                                
1 The average of finance and economics rankings may result in the inclusion of schools which would not be 
ranked highly in one of the two departments. For example, Princeton has no finance department but still 
made the top 25 because of their high ranking in economics.  In the case of UBC, the ranking is largely 
driven by the high ranking scores of its finance department. 
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 One might argue that classification of 25 universities as being elite may be too 
broad. As a robustness check, we run all of our estimations based on classifying only top 
ten schools as being elite. The conclusions do not change. 
Faculty affiliation is based on where individuals self-report their location each 
year, not the affiliation reported in published articles. Identifying the physical location of 
individuals during the production process is crucial to estimate a university effect on 
productivity. Thus we undertake a painstaking three-step procedure to manually compile 
the appropriate faculty affiliation.  
First, we extract curriculum vitaes (cv’s) from websites for finance and economics 
faculty currently employed by the top 25 universities.2 Second, we look at every 
individual’s cv for every economics and finance faculty for all universities included in 
Business Week’s top 100 business schools and the National Research Council’s top 100 
economics programs for 2002 (a total of 138 additional universities). If an individual in 
the additional universities ever held a position in any of our top 25 universities, that 
person is included in the dataset. Third, we capture faculty who moved to other 
professions, retired, or passed away during our sample period by contacting the archives 
of each of our 25 universities to request a faculty roster for the economics and finance 
departments over 5-year intervals starting in 1973; namely, 1973, 1978, 1983, and 1988.3  
These archives and obituary records, supplemented with the Hasselback-Prentice Hall 
Guide to the Finance Faculty for 1993, provide the majority of the missing names for the 
earlier periods. 
From faculty cv’s, we extract individuals’ university affiliations and position 
ranks over time, as well as doctoral and undergraduate degree institutions and graduation 
years.  When the websites publish only biographical sketches that do not contain the full 
historical detail, we fill in unavailable data following a series of procedures. We email a 
subset of individuals to request their full vitae. We also use relevant statistics derived 
from the set of full cv’s of other faculty members to fill in estimates of the missing 
                                                
2 This work was conducted during the period May, 2003 to March, 2004.   
3 A few universities were unable to supply us with the archive reports.  For these schools, we searched the 
university websites for records of department retirements and obituaries from the 1970s and 1980s.  
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variables.4 The result of our efforts is a dataset of 3,262 faculty members whose careers 
touch over 800 universities. 
 
B. Publication sample selection 
Measuring research productivity requires selecting a reasonable number of 
economics and finance journals. To avoid making choices based on our priors, we use all 
of the 36 economics journals and the top five of the finance journals used by the ranking 
studies summarized in Table 1.5  We exclude all but the top five finance journals in an 
effort to equalize the minimum quality standard across finance and other economic 
subfields. This is important because the calculations of productivity are pooled across all 
economics subfields, including finance.  With these five finance journals, our data show 
that the average (impact-weighted) productivity of finance faculty is roughly equivalent 
to that of economics faculty. 
We obtain article information for the period 1970-2004 from two sources.  Our 
primary source of data is EBSCO Information Services, a publication data vendor.  The 
EBSCO download consists of 73,039 articles, representing 48,917 author names and 
111,150 unique article-author observations.6  We hand match the EBSCO author names 
to our list of 3,262 faculty to capture inconsistencies in naming conventions.  Of the 
111,150 article-author observations, 25,010 of them correspond to our list of faculty ever 
                                                
4 Missing Ph.D. years are replaced with the first year that the person appears as an assistant professor in our 
database.  If the first assistant professor year is 1970, which is the start date for our database, or if the 
person is never an assistant professor in our database, the Ph.D. year is replaced with the undergraduate 
graduation year plus 6 years, the median time between degrees in our sample of full cv’s. Likewise, 
missing undergraduate graduation years are inferred from the Ph.D. year.  If we are unsure of promotion 
years, we infer promotion dates using the university department’s decade average time spent in each 
promotion rank, which is again computed from our sample of full cv’s for that university. Finally, if the 
individual retired, passed away, or otherwise disappeared such that we are unable to locate a website or a 
cv at all (less than 10% of the cases), we infer institutional attachment via affiliations cited on journal 
articles.   
5 The list of 36 economics journals comes from the union of all journals covered by the four studies shown 
in Table 1 which do not use the universe of journals in the Social Science Citation Index or EconLit.  The 
top 5 finance journals according to Arnold, Butler, Crack, and Altintig (2003) are Journal of Finance, 
Journal of Financial Economics, Review of Financial Studies, Journal of Business, and Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis.  Econometrica is also included in Arnold et al.’s list and is already 
included in the economics list. 
6 EBSCO’s classification scheme allows us to discard comments, notes, book reviews, and other non-article 
publications. We discard articles with less than three pages and verify the page count and content for 
articles with three-four pages or page counts greater than 69. 
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affiliated with the top 25 universities. We also collect citation counts for each article by 
downloading them from the ISI Web of Science / Social Science Citation Index (SSCI).7 
To approximate the timing when the actual work was performed, we lag the 
publication date of articles to account for time spent in research and write-up, the peer 
review process, and journal publication backlog.  The lag adjustment is complicated by 
the variance of lags in review and in publication across journals.  Fortunately, Ellison 
(2002) calculates the decade average submission-to-acceptance time in months for 20 
journals included in our sample.  For the other journals, we use the average lag time of 
the economics or finance journals included in Ellison.8 Ellison’s lag, however, does not 
include the lag from acceptance to publication and from work to submission. 
The lag between acceptance and publication varies depending on the journal 
backlog. To estimate this lag, we look at two journals (the Review of Economic Studies 
(RES) and the Journal of Financial Economics (JFE)) that report the acceptance date of 
each paper.  For each year in 1970-2002, we randomly 15 articles from the RES and JFE 
and calculate the mean lag time from submission to publication. Figure 1, Panels A and 
B, present plots of these sampled lag times, depicted as the solid line. Ellison’s lag times 
(the dashed line) are smaller because the sampled lag time includes Ellison’s submission-
to-acceptance estimate plus the publication backlog time. To account for the time spent 
between acceptance and publication (seven months on average) and the time between the 
middle-of-writing and submission, we add one year to Ellison’s lag. Our final lagging 
time is represented by the upper grey dashed line. 
 
C. Productivity measures 
After mapping publications to the year and place of production, we aggregate 
pages from different journals into a yearly measure of individual productivity.  Because 
                                                
7 The Web of Science data have several limitations. Often all but the first author are excluded from the 
author lists when the number of coauthors is greater than two (Alexander and Mabry, 1994), and the author 
first names are abbreviated. Although matching the abbreviated names to publications with precision is 
difficult, we circumvent the problem by mapping the journal issue and page range to the EBSCO data. 
8More precisely, for finance journals not included in Ellison, we use the average of the Journal of Finance 
and the Journal of Financial Economics, the two finance journals covered by Ellison, for the 1980s and 
1990. For the 1970s we only use the Journal of Finance lag because the JFE started in the mid-1970s and 
had unrepresentatively short publication process time during the 1970s.  
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typesetting, page length conventions and quality differ across journals, we follow the 
standard approach of converting measures of productivity into AER equivalents. 
The four most commonly used measures of academic productivity are counts of 
articles written,9 raw counts of publication pages,10 citations to published articles,11 and 
impact-weighted counts of pages where impact is gauged by the citations to the journal in 
which the publication occurs.12  Each measure has strengths and weaknesses, which we 
discuss briefly as we describe their calculation.13 
The count of articles published is the simplest productivity measure and is 
calculated by summing the number of articles each individual publishes in the 41 journals 
each year. The shortcoming of this measure is its inability to distinguish between main 
articles and shorter articles: all of them count the same. The second, easier to address, 
problem is that it is a very discrete measure.  In spite of these shortcomings, we include 
article count in our selection of measures to alleviate concerns of article length inflation 
over time, which we shall discuss momentarily. 
The second measure of productivity, raw productivity, is calculated by summing 
pages published, adjusted to AER equivalents and divided by the number of coauthors in 
each article, for individual i in year t across all journals j.  
 
 
The number of pages and coauthors for each article are from the EBSCO dataset.14 The 
AER equivalent adjustment normalizes each journal to the length of the AER to account 
for different typesetting and conventions in article lengths. We follow Graves, Marchand, 
and Thompson (1982) in normalizing both the average number of pages per article and 
                                                
9 Heck, Cooley, and Hubbard (1986) 
10 Klemkosky and Tuttle (1977); Graves, Marchand, and Thompson (1982); Niemi, (1987); Scott and 
Mitias (1996) 
11 Davis and Papanek (1984); Blair, Cottle, and Wallace (1986) 
12 Liebowitz and Palmer (1984); Alexander and Mabry (1994); Laband and Piette (1994); Borokhovich , 
Bricker, Brunarski, and Simkins (1995); Conroy and Dusansky (1995) 
13 Other measures of individual productivity in economics and finance research include representation on 
editorial boards (Kaufman, 1984) and references in graduate-level texts (Liner, 2002). 
14 Page counts were missing in 3% of the article-author observations.  We use the average pages for the 
appropriate journal and year for these observations.  Normalizing by the number of coauthors is consistent 
with the findings of Sauer (1988) that the salary return to papers coauthored by n authors is approximately 

















Raw  )    (
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words per page to the AER.15 The normalization of raw to the AER equivalent allows 
productivity assigned to an individual to be interpreted as the number of AER pages 
produced in a given year.  
Raw page counts are simple to use and easy to understand, but they do not assess 
the quality of articles. One way to assess the quality of articles is to use the citation 
method, which weights every article by its number of citations as recorded in the Social 
Science Citation Index (SSCI).  Citations are perhaps the most direct measure of an 
article’s influence. This method, however, has four potential flaws, some of which are 
particularly severe for our purposes. 
First, SSCI counts citations from thousands of journals, not just from journals at 
the forefront of the research in the field.  Second, citations create a bias in terms of fields 
or type of articles. For example, survey articles tend to be heavily cited, and 9 of the 20 
most-cited articles in economics are econometric foundation papers (e.g., White (1980)). 
Third, citations are highly skewed, magnifying possible misidentification of 
faculty’s affiliation at a particular point in time. If the time lag applied from publication 
to writing is incorrect for a ground-breaking article, a huge number of citations belonging 
to one institution would be inappropriately credited to the wrong institution. 
Groundbreaking articles are more susceptible to misidentification because they are more 
likely to face longer than average delays in the publication process. Given the 
disproportionate weights that these articles carry in terms of citations, a mistake would 
have an enormous impact on the estimates. Even without a mistake, the influence factors 
of high-citation observations would imply that a few observations completely determine 
the OLS estimates. 
The final and, perhaps, most immediate obstacle to the use of citations as a 
measure of productivity is that they have a lifetime of their own. Citations-per-year tend 
be low initially, peak after roughly thirteen years, and then decline slowly.  Hence, to 
measure the impact of recent papers we would have to predict future citation on the basis 
of early ones, making it difficult to compare productivity in the 1970s with productivity 
in the 1990s.  
                                                
15 In making the page count adjustment, we exclude the AER Proceedings issue. To obtain the word-per-
page adjustment, we count the number of words for a standard, non-equation page for each of the 41 
journals for three decade observations: 1975, 1985, and 1995. 
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The impact-weighted count of pages, impact productivity, is a compromise 
between raw productivity and citation counts, incorporating key features of each.  We 
follow the non-iterated method of Liebowitz and Palmer (1984) and Laband and Piette 
(1994), in which publication pages are credited to the individual faculty as in the raw 
productivity calculation, and the credit is weighted by number of citations to the journal 
in which the publication appears. The impact productivity is defined as: 
 
 
The impact factor for journal j in decade d is simply the number of citations to 
journal j appearing in the references of all articles in the source journals s: s∈ {1,…, 41}, 




We make the same AER equivalent adjustment in both the number of articles and the 
words per article and normalize each impact factor to that of the AER.   
Calculating impact factors based on the SSCI would be subject to the same 
criticism as using citations; namely, they draw from the universe of all journals, and not 
journals at the forefront of research. Thus, we create impact factors custom-made to our 
need. We manually count citations of each of the 41 journals by reviewing the reference 
lists of every article in the 41 journals for three base decade years, 1975, 1985, and 1995.  
If one of the authors writing the article is self-cited, the citation is excluded. This method 
allows for variation in journal impact over decade.  In total, we collect reference counts 
for over 6,000 articles. The adjustments and normalizations allow us to interpret impact 
productivity, Impactit, as the number of AER impact equivalent pages.  
Table 2 shows impact factors and the decade rank of the impact factors for 36 
economics journals and 5 finance journals (with the Journal of Business classified as a 
finance journal) for the 3 decades. Although the rankings of journals is generally 
persistent (with a Kendall’s tau-b rank correlation of approximately 0.70 across decades), 


































eighth position in the 1970s and 1980s to the second position in the 1990s. 16 In the 
meantime the Journal of Economic Theory (JET) declined from the thirteen position in 
the 1970s, to fifteenth in the 1980s and twenty-ninth in the 1990s.  The JET trend is 
characteristic of economic journals, many of which have dropped in impact rankings over 
time. 
Laband and Piette (1994) report impact factors using the larger set of SSCI 
journals, which give more weight to lower-tier journals, for roughly the same time 
periods as our 1970s and 1980s calculations.  They also adjust for article counts that 
include comments and note.  In spite of these differences, the correlation between our 
impact factor and theirs is 0.88 in the 1970s and 0.83 in the 1980s.   
 
D. Summary statistics 
Table 3 reports the summary statistics and correlations of the four canonical 
measures of individual productivity.  The mean raw productivity per faculty (6.3) is 
approximately double that of impact (3.1) over the entire period.  The average number of 
articles is 0.62 per year.  Both raw and impact measures increase from the 1970s to the 
1980s, with a slight reversion in the 1990s. In contrast, article counts have steadily 
declined from 0.75 in the 1970s to 0.53 in the 1990s. The medians are zero for all three 
measures over all three decades. 
The statistics concerning citations illustrate our reservation to use it as a 
productivity measure. We download citations (through 2005) for each article published 
during the three decade periods. The mean citation counts for the articles published in the 
1990s (7.8) is less than one-third of those of the two previous decades (27.5, 25.7), 
                                                
16 Liebowitz and Palmer (1984) also develop an iterated impact factor method, which weights the citations 
to each journal according to the impact factor of the source journal citing the reference. Calculation of the 
iterated impact factor results in large impact factors for finance journals vis-à-vis general economics or, in 
particular, other economics subfields. Specifically, the Journal of Finance and the Journal of Financial 
Economics rank first and second in the 1990s under this method. Although this is interesting and warrants 
further study to examine the causes, the large finance impact factor makes it difficult to compare research 
productivity across economic subfields. If we were to use the iterated impact factors, an economics faculty 
publishing in a finance journal would be given more weight relative to her colleagues publishing in other 
subfields, making the comparison somewhat inequitable. The large finance impact factor is also partially 
due to insular citing within the finance field because, unlike other economics subfields, finance is a 
separate department. Finally, all the authors of this paper are from finance departments; thus, we would 
rather take the risk of underestimating the impact of finance rather than the risk of getting caught in a 
controversy over the relative impact of economics versus finance. 
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demonstrating the timing problem of using citations.  Statistical problems also appear in 
the standard deviations and skewness.  For the 1970s, for example, standard deviation for 
citations is 4.4 times as large as the mean, whereas none of the standard deviations for 
raw, impact, and article counts exceeds two times the magnitude of the mean.  The 
skewness for citations is approximately 14; for the other measures, the skew ranges 
between 2 and 3. 
Table 3, Panels B and C, present the correlations among the four productivity 
measures. The rank correlations are high for all combinations of measures. However, the 
Pearson correlations for citations with any of the other measures lose half of their 
magnitude, although they remain positively significant and strong. The lower linear 
correlations are due to the huge skewness in citations counts, validating our decision to 
omit citations as a measure of productivity. 
 
E.  Productivity Comparability over Decades 
Because we are interested in productivity over time, it is important that we are 
able to compare a unit of productivity output across decades. To check the comparability 
over time, first consider the shifts in supply of and demand for manuscripts submitted for 
publication during the three decades. The ratio of supply (the number of manuscripts 
submitted) over demand (the number of articles published) in AER was 7.2 in the first 
five years of the 1970s, which almost doubled to 12.7 in the last five years leading to 
2002.17 This suggests that a simple AER article count measure would undervalue 
productivity in 2000 relative to the 1970s. Consistent with this conjecture, Panel A in 
Table 3 shows a steady decline in the average article counts over the three decades. 
                                                
17 These data are from the Reports of the Editor published each year. The increase in manuscripts 
submissions may be attributed to three possible sources – more time per faculty for preparing manuscripts, 
more faculty per university, and more universities participating in the publication market.  Although 
difficult to quantify precisely, teaching loads have been reduced substantially over the three decades, 
allowing more time for research production. The growth in faculty per university can be estimated using the 
archive reports of faculty rosters. We find that the growth in the size of economics (finance) faculty for the 
top 25 schools is cumulatively 26% (69%) from 1973 to 2001. These figures capture only the intensive 
margin, ignoring the growth in the number of institutions with faculty submitting to top journals. Heck, 
Cooley, and Hubbard (1996) find that whereas 201 institutions are represented in the JF during 1966-1975, 
270 institutions are represented in the 1975-1985 JF publications, corresponding to a 34% growth in the 
extensive margin for finance. Goyal et al. (2006) document that the number of authors publishing (not 
trying to publish) in existing EconLit journals rose from 22,960 in the 1970s to 32,773 in the 1990s, a 43% 
increase. 
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However, Ellison (2002) finds that a 2000 article is twice as long as a 1970 
article.18 Indeed the number of pages per article has doubled for the AER over the same 
period, making the ratio of pages submitted to pages published roughly constant over 
time. Although this might suggest the use of raw productivity as the time-comparable 
measure, this calculation does not factor in the increase in the number of journals. Of the 
41 journals in our sample, only 24 existed in 1970. With the additional pages from new 
journals, raw productivity will over-estimate productivity in later years. 
A compromise measure is found in impact productivity, which removes the effect 
of the increase in number of journals. When a new journal arrives, it competes with 
existing journals for citations, often diminishing the impact factor of other second-tier 
journals. The impact productivity measure also diminishes the article inflation because 
most article inflation occurs in second-tier journals, which are given lower impact 
weights. Consistent with this intuition, Table 3 shows that individual average impact 
productivity has remained fairly constant over three decades. Thus we focus on impact 
productivity as our main measure, and use raw and article counts as robustness checks.  
 
II. Empirical Results 
A. Average Faculty Productivity 
Table 4 reports average individual productivity by university and decade in terms 
of impact, raw, and article counts for the top 25 schools and others. All non-top 25 
universities are clustered into a twenty-sixth university called other. The numbers 
indicate that faculty members are on average more productive while at the top 25 
universities than while at other universities, and the difference in average productivity 
(shown in the bottom row) grows larger over time.  This does not mean, however, that the 
top 25 universities make individuals more productive. The average productivity levels do 
not isolate the marginal effect of universities (the university fixed effect) on individuals’ 
productivity above and beyond what the individual brings. 
 
 
                                                
18 Ellison (2002) finds that the number of pages in the average economics article in top tier journals 
increases by 70-100% from the mid-1970s through the late 1990s. Consistently, the average article length 
in our data grows from 10.7 pages in 1970 to 21.9 in 2001, exactly doubling over the three decades. 
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B. University Fixed Effects Methodology 
To isolate the university fixed effect, we remove the individual characteristics 
affecting productivity. Then, we control for common factors influencing individual 
productivity – primarily, experience and position rank. In essence, we view the university 
fixed effect as that of a treatment; we would like to remove all other factors influencing 
productivity such that we can compare treatments across universities. 
A fairly general representation of the identification of productivity effects is given 
in (1). 
       irfutirtirfutirfuty ε+β+α+θ= X      (1) 
 
The subscripts index individuals (i: i∈ 1,…, 3262), position rank (r: r ∈  assistant 
professor, associate professor, full professor, chaired full professor), fields (f: f ∈  
economics, finance), universities (u: u ∈  {top 25 schools}, others), and years (t: t∈  
1970,…, 2001).  yirfut is the productivity (impact, raw, article) of individual i during year 
t. θrfut is a general notation for the level effects of rank, field, university, decade, and all 
of their interactions. In practice, we make some restrictions on the interactions for 
tractability and describe them in Appendix 1. 
The αi are the individual fixed effects, which are included to control for 
differences in individual faculty quality. In specifying θrfut and α i as such, we implicitly 
assume that the individual’s fixed effect does not interact with rank, field, or time (or 
their interactions) in a way that would be systematic to schools.   
Xirt is the matrix of individual control variables, varying over time and 
representing common factors across faculty which may affect individual productivity 
irrespective of physical location. These include the number of years elapsed since an 
individual’s first academic appointment (career years), whether or not the individual is a 
visiting faculty in that year (visiting), and the impact weight of the journal for which the 
person is currently editing (editor impact).  
There is no reason to expect career years to be related linearly to productivity 
(Oster and Hamermesh, 1998). Given that our primary interest is not in the structural 
explanation for career years, but in controlling for its relation with productivity, we 
allow the data to dictate the form of the relation for which we control.  A plot of impact 
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and raw productivity as a function of career years is shown in Figure 2.  In a univariate 
setting, raw productivity increases for the first few years of an individual’s career and 
then declines, eventually at a declining rate. Impact productivity reaches its peak during 
the first couple of years and soon thereafter declines monotonically. The figure suggests 
that productivity is inversely related to age, and that the relation warrants a cubic 
functional form.   
To establish a baseline, we first estimate a model of individual productivity which 
includes individual fixed effects (to capture the quality of each faculty member); career 
experience years and stages of career (to control for general productivity trends for all 
faculty); field effects (to eliminate differences in productivity standards between finance 
and economics); and decade fixed effects (to control for possible trends in average 
productivity). We then add the university fixed effects at a decade-field level. The 
empirical model is given by:    
irfutirtifududfuufddfrirfuty ε+β+α+θ+θ+θ+θ+θ+θ+θ+θ= X  
          (2) 
Estimation of (2) allows us to address three key questions.  First, are the 
university fixed effects significant in any statistical and economic way in explaining 
variation in productivity? As in Bertrand and Scholar (2003), we perform a simple F-test 
of joint statistical significance of university fixed effects en masse. In our case, this is 
only the first, but necessary, step. If the university fixed effects are not significant, then 
any additional tests would be redundant. Even a finding of no fixed effect would be 
interesting because it would suggest that the research environment has no effect on 
individual productivity.   
If the university fixed effects are significant, it raises another question: what 
factors drive the university fixed effects? Is it peer pressure, organizational culture, 
weather, or outside consulting opportunities that drive whether one university is more 
conducive to research than another? The final question we address is whether university 
fixed effects vary over time.  Hopefully, this should give some insights into the long term 




C. University Fixed Effects Results 
Table 5 reports the estimates of model (2) for impact productivity (columns 1 and 
2), raw productivity (columns 3 and 4), and article count productivity (columns 5 and 6).  
Article count productivity is estimated with a Poisson model to incorporate the count 
nature of the data, and thus the coefficient magnitudes cannot be directly compared with 
the other columns. Columns 2, 4, and 6 include university fixed effects, while columns 1, 
3, and 5 do not.  
An initial observation is that the effects of career experience, editorship, and 
visiting status are not very sensitive to the choice of productivity measure. As already 
shown in Figure 2, productivity is the highest in early career years.  When we use the 
estimates from columns 1, 3, and 5 to plot productivity over career years, we find that 
impact productivity is highest during the rookie year. Raw and article count 
productivities peak between the fourth and sixth year (not coincidentally the time of 
tenure decision in most places) and drop monotonically afterwards. Age has a particularly 
large negative influence on impact productivity. Even beyond the effect of rank, a faculty 
member produces 1.8 fewer impact pages per year after 20 career years, a drop of 44% 
from the rookie year (years zero and one). For raw productivity, the inference is a bit 
smaller: the faculty produces 2.1 raw pages per year less than at the peak, a drop of 15%.  
The fact that the impact productivity peaks at the rookie year and declines 
thereafter provides a possible answer to the puzzle of why schools devote so much energy 
and resources to recruit rookies when they can hire seasoned junior faculty with proven 
track records and more polished teaching abilities. The standard answer used to be that 
rookies have a higher option value. We provide a much simpler explanation: To hire 
researchers at their peak, the optimal year is the rookie one. 
Faculty with higher rank also seem to be less productive. After taking into 
account career years and individual differences in talent, the marginal impact of being an 
associate professor is one-half page less impact productivity compared to assistant 
professors. The marginal impact of being a full professor is almost one page less; for a 
chaired professor, it is one and one-third pages less. Since we are already controlling for 
career years, it is impossible to interpret these numbers in a causal way. We are interested 
in them only as controls and note that all of our results are robust to their omission. 
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Accounting for career years and rank, the impact productivity of a chaired professor 
twenty years after the Ph.D. is 75% lower than at the beginning of the career. With this 
result, we are only measuring academic article productivity. Older faculty might produce 
in other ways, such as with greater administrative service and mentoring of junior faculty 
and doctoral students. 
Editing a journal is not negatively associated with productivity. One possible 
explanation is that editors are a selected group; only active senior faculty become editors. 
Hence, the editor variable captures not only the negative effect of the time commitment 
to editing, but also the positive effect of remaining actively engaged in research despite a 
relatively senior rank. Alternatively, it is possible that editors have expertise in writing 
papers suited for the publication process and thus can maintain their productivity level in 
spite of the time commitment required by the editorship.   
 The coefficients on the decade dummy variables in columns 1 and 5 show no 
increase in impact or article count productivities for economics faculty from the 1970s to 
the 1980s or 1990s. In contrast, the decade coefficients for raw productivity in column 3 
are significantly positive. This result is due to the publication inflation inherent in raw 
productivity described earlier. Hereafter, we rely on the impact productivity to make 
cross-decades comparisons. The coefficients on the interaction of decades with finance 
faculty are significantly negative by a similar magnitude across decades, implying that 
finance faculty are less productive than those in economics departments.   
 Column 2 adds university fixed effects to the specification.  The university fixed 
effects are estimated at a decade-field level.  In other words, we fit 153 fixed effects (26 
schools x 2 departments x 3 decades =156 – 3 for the absence of a finance department at 
Princeton).  The F-test for joint significance of the university fixed effects is 35.28, well 
above conventional significance thresholds, establishing the relevance of examining 
university fixed effects. The effects of the control variables on productivity do not 
materially change with the inclusion of the university fixed effects.  
The only coefficients that change markedly are those on the decade dummies. For 
impact productivity, the decade coefficients for the 1980s and1990s are a significantly 
positive 0.481 and 1.116, respectively. One must be careful in interpreting the decade 
coefficients, as they take on a different interpretation when the university fixed effects are 
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included. The offset of the university fixed effects structure is an others university in 
economics in the 1970s.19 The positive decade coefficients imply that a move from one of 
the top 25 universities to one of the others increases productivity relative to the effect of 
moving to an other in the 1970s. In other words, the relative fixed effect of other schools 
has increased by almost one-half an impact-weighted AER page in the 1980s and by more 
than one full impact-weighted AER page in the 1990s. 
 This productivity diffusion from top universities to others over the last two 
decades can be seen more clearly in panel B of Table 5. It presents the university fixed 
effects by decades, separately for economics and finance. These coefficients are 
interpreted as the influence of each of the 25 universities on faculty publications over and 
above that of the same faculty member when residing at an other university. While the 
coefficients show that there were 17 and 16 universities with significantly positive effects 
in the 1970s for economics and finance, respectively, there were only 2 and 4 universities 
with positive effects by the 1990s.  In fact, in the 1990s, nine economics and seven 
finance departments had negative fixed effects.  The declines in the effect of elite 
universities on productivity can be seen more clearly in Figure 3, which plots the 
coefficients over time for each university, separately for economics (panel A) and finance 
(panel B). 
 Caution should be exercised in interpreting these fixed effects results. Although it 
may be surprising to see that some of the most elite universities exhibit negative fixed 
effects, these effects do not mean that the elite universities have less productive faculty 
members relative to other universities. Because the individual fixed effects are removed, 
the negative university effects mean that individuals are less productive when residing at 
that university than at other universities.  Our exclusion of book publications and case 
writing from the productivity measure may also contribute to the negative fixed effects.  
For example, the Harvard finance group exhibits consistently negative effects throughout 
the three decades, perhaps because of its emphasis on case writing.  
 To the extent that trade-offs are made in allocating resources to research versus 
teaching, our estimate of university fixed effects may bias against schools that emphasize 
                                                
19 Although the other set of faculty does not represent the universe of faculty at all other universities, the 
interpretation of the other fixed effect remains valid in that the individual fixed effects have been removed. 
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teaching.  It may be argued that since Business Week began ranking MBA programs in 
the early 1990s, the top business schools in the U.S. put more emphasis and resources 
into teaching, thus contributing to the decline in the university effects during the 1990s.  
Economics departments, however, are not under the same pressure (the US News & 
World Report ranking does not put the same emphasis on teaching as does Business 
Week), and no obvious shift has taken place from research to teaching in economics 
departments.  Thus, our omission of teaching-related activities in measuring productivity 
is not likely to be responsible for the reduction in the positive effects on research 
productivity that top universities enjoyed during the 1970s.   
  
     III.       Treatment Selection Bias in University Effects Estimation 
A concern with the estimates is that they are subject to a possible treatment 
selection bias. The location of an individual at any point in time can best be thought of as 
a two-sided search model, in which the university looks for the best person to fill its 
needs and the person chooses the best university opportunity that maximizes utility. 20 
Factors important in the utility may include possible productivity spillovers, proximity to 
one’s origin, alma mater, less pressure to produce, etc. Two-sided matching might bias 
the university fixed effects upwards or downwards, and the bias is likely to depend on a 
faculty’s position. We consider four possible selection bias stories specific to the position 
of the faculty and the prestige of the university where the faculty might move. 
The first source of selection bias arises if our results are driven by full professors 
moving to lesser schools to quasi-retire. If full professors leave elite schools to other 
universities with the intent of lowering their effort, the other school fixed effect will be 
biased downwards.  
A second selection story concerns assistant and associate professors who move to 
less prestigious universities because of a failure to obtain tenure or promotion. It is 
difficult to predict how individuals’ effort levels respond to such moves. One likely story 
is that the post-move productivity level falls because the faculty has lost some of his 
intrinsic motivation to do well, thereby biasing downward the university fixed effect for 
                                                
20 See MacLeod and Parent (1999) and Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) for examples of endogenous 
matching applications. 
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the lower-ranked schools. Another possible story is that the pressure for seminal work at 
the very top schools might be relieved with a move to a lower-ranked school, resulting in 
higher quantities of publications which would bias the university effect upward for the 
lower-ranked schools. 
The third selection concern arises if universities tend to make offers to people 
who they consider have good future prospects and if individuals tend to accept offers 
from universities with a research environment complementary to their needs and 
attributes. This match is more likely to occur for successful individuals moving to higher 
ranked or lateral schools, irrespective of position rank. The complementarity would lead 
to higher productivity in the new location (adjusting for age and career status), generating 
positive university fixed effects for the elite schools.21 
Finally, our estimates would be biased if there is an implicit tournament. For 
example, a tenured faculty at Rochester might continue to work with the goal of making 
it to Stanford, if she considers Stanford highest in the ladder, while a Stanford person 
may have no higher career goal to reach (except for the Nobel prize). A tournament bias 
would result in a negative university fixed effect for the very top schools, as individuals 
who reach the top fail to sustain the high level of productivity once they arrive. 
To assess the magnitude of these potential sources of biases, we construct a 
transition matrix of changes in productivity around moves as a function of the direction 
of the move (up, lateral, or down) and as a function of the status of faculty rank (full 
professor or not). The change in productivity is the average individual-adjusted 
productivity in the two years after a move minus the average individual-adjusted 
productivity in the two years before a move. Individual adjusted productivity is defined 
as the residual of a regression of individual productivity on career years, career years 
squared, career years cubed, rank, visiting, and editor status. We drop the first year at the 
new university to account for possible set up costs in moving. An up move is a move 
                                                
21 The flip side of the complementarity story is that the hiring practices of universities have changed. To 
explain our results with this story, one would need that the top universities were more effective in hiring in 
the 1970s than in the 1990s. To test this story, we compare the productivity, adjusted for age and rank, of 
individuals coming into a school with that of incumbent faculty. Using the average adjusted productivity 
from the prior two years, we find the same pattern: new hires have higher productivity than incumbents for 
every decade (0.67 in the 1970s, 1.44 in the 1980s, and 1.00 in the 1990s). The 1970’s new hire surplus is 
smaller than that of the 1990s, invalidating this story as a potential explanation for the disappearance of the 
fixed effect. 
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from any university that is not in the top 5 to a top 5 institution or from an others 
university to a top 25.22 A down move is any move from a top 5 to a non-top 5 or from a 
top 25 to others.  A lateral move is a move within the top 5, within the top 25 
universities, or within the others universities. 
 The overall results reported in Table 6 do not provide convincing evidence that 
the declining positive elite university fixed effects are due to any of the four selection 
biases.  We describe evidence concerning each story. When there are hints of legitimacy 
in the stories, we construct additional tests to ascertain if our results are robust to 
selection bias.  
 
A. Quasi-retirement Story    
The quasi-retirement selection story predicts negative changes in productivity for 
full professors moving to lower ranked schools. Although all downward moves of full 
professors show negative signs, none are significant. Furthermore, the changes in 
productivity following downward moves are indistinguishable from those following other 
types of moves by full professors.  
 
B. Non-promoted Moving Down Story 
The second selection story, non-promoted individuals move down and decrease 
productivity, finds some support from the transition matrix. The downward movement of 
assistant and associate professors in the 1980s has a negative productivity impact, but the 
effect is positive and insignificant for the 1970s and 1990s. For this selection story to 
explain our declining positive university fixed effect, individuals moving down in the 
1970s should exhibit more negative productivity shocks than individuals moving down in 
1980s. Since this pattern is not observed in the data, the non-promoted moving down 
story cannot explain our results. Nevertheless, we repeat our main estimation of the 
university fixed effects while interacting the university fixed effect with faculty rank. The 
results from this estimation are presented in Appendix 2, which shows diminishing 
                                                
22 The top five universities are defined to be those on a decade level with the highest average impact 
productivity for the faculty members as reported in Table 4 separately for finance and economics. 
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university fixed effects over time for assistant and associate professors as well as for full 
and chaired professors. 
 
C. Complementarity Story 
The third selection story also finds only isolated support in the transition matrix. 
If faculty move to benefit from a particular elite university’s complementarity, then we 
would expect a positive impact for upward or lateral moves irrespective of the faculty 
rank. Of the twelve relevant combinations of ranks and decades for the lateral and up 
moves, seven are statistically zero; two are statistically negative; and one is statistically 
positive. The lone positive impact on productivity occurs for assistant and associate 
professors moving upward in the 1970s. Notice that the productivity measure already 
removes the effect of rank and age. Even if the complementarity selection story can 
explain some of the positive university fixed effects in the 1970s, it cannot explain its 
disappearance in the 1980s and 1990s without relying on the disappearance of the 
university fixed effects.  
With complementarity, an individual brings something that fits well with the 
university to generate synergies that result in higher productivity. That is, the 
complementarity effect contributes to the positive component of a university fixed effect. 
For example, to explain the disappearance of Harvard economics department’s positive 
fixed effect in the 1980s and 1990s using the complementarity story, one must argue that 
while assistant and associate professors in the 1970s were attracted to Harvard with the 
hope for higher productivity, the new set of professors with similar rank do not have the 
same motivation to move to Harvard in the 1980s and 1990s. That is, in the 1970s 
younger faculty expected to enjoy a positive externality from being at Harvard, while in 
the 1980s and 1990s they did not. But this is tantamount to our hypothesis: During the 
last three decades big research centers have lost much of their appeal because the 
externality produced by having high-caliber colleagues has diffused beyond the physical 





D. Tournament Story 
The final selection story, the tournament story, implies that the impact of up 
moves, especially for full professors, is negative. Panel A of Table 6 shows that up moves 
by full professors have statistically zero effects on productivity in the 1970s and the 
1980s, but the impact turned negative in the 1990s. The negative result in the 1990s is 
consistent with a regression to the mean hypothesis. Faculty receiving offers after an 
exceptional spurt of productivity are unable to sustain the high productivity after the 
move. However, this theory cannot explain the inter-temporal pattern of our university 
fixed effects because it is difficult to explain why tournaments appear in the 1990s but 
not in the 1970s and 1980s. 
 
 E. Two-Stage Selection Model 
Nevertheless, to check whether the magnitude of the estimated university fixed 
effects is biased by endogeneity, we formally address the problem by estimating a 
treatment model in which the selection into university treatment is not random. The 
selection model consists of two pieces – estimating the probabilities both of moving and, 
given a move, of locating to a particular university. We estimate the probability of a 
move with a logit selection based on age. We then fit McFadden’s (1974) conditional 
logit model to generate predicted probabilities for each individual to be at each location at 
each point in time. A conditional logit selection specification is a convenient tool when 
the individual’s observed location is the result of a multi-choice problem (Trost and Lee, 
1984). After fitting the two logits, we then use the multiplied predicted probabilities as 
instruments for the university fixed effects indicators in the second stage. The standard 
errors are corrected for error in the first stage estimation by bootstrapping the logits 500 
times in the first stage and adding the variance in the predicted probabilities from the first 
stage estimates to the regression variance in the second stage following Petrin and Train 
(2001).  
The estimating equations are: 
(i) First Stage – Probability of moving: 
( )[ ]ageflogit moveit =φ  
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(ii) First Stage – Probability of location = u:  
( )iutiutmove | locateiut Zlogit lconditiona ν+η=φ   
(iii) Multiplication to obtain predicted probability of being at a location: 
move | locatemove
itiut iut
ˆˆρ̂ φ∗φ=  
(iv) Second stage – Estimation of university effects 
  irfutirti
*
fddfrirfut ρ̂y ε+β+α+θ+θ+θ+θ+θ= Xufdiut       (3) 
The goal of the two first stages of the selection model is to obtain iutρ̂ : the predicted 
probability of individual i being at university u at time t.  In (i), we estimate a logit 
of
move
itφ , the probability that individual i moves in time t, as a function of age. In (ii), we 
refer to each location u as the potential location. Ziut are the exogenous variables for being 
at location u specific to individual i at time t. Estimating a conditional logit requires that 
the exogenous variables have some variance across potential locations u in each period 
for each individual. Equation (iii) is the multiplication of the probability of moving times 
the conditional probability of a location given a move to arrive at the unconditional 
probability of being at a location. In the second stage equation (iv), *ufdθ is the decade-
field university effects based on the instrumented location of each individual. The rest of 
the second stage equation is the same as in equation (2). 
To estimate the propensity to move, we fit a polynomial of the fourth order on the 
individual’s age. Higher orders did not materially increase the LRT test statistic for 
relevance. Individuals tend to move more in their youth, reflecting a steady increase in 
the transaction costs to moving as one ages. If individuals have children, their mobility is 
constrained until children graduate from high school, possibly followed by more freedom 
to re-locate during late 40’s and early 50’s. Age is a good exogenous selection variable 
for moving because it may predict life cycle patterns to moving, but it cannot predict 
which individuals at a certain age will move to universities for either complementarity or 
tournament reasons.  
Given an estimate of each individual’s probability of a move for each year, we 
then estimate the locational choice part of the selection process. The key to the locational 
choice estimation is to find good exogenous variables predicting the preference of 
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location for each individual. We use four variables. The first is based individuals’ 
preferences for locations close to their origin. Because we cannot obtain city of birth 
information for our sample, we use the city where their undergraduate university is 
located as a proxy. The closeness to one’s origin is measured by distance in flight times. 
To create this instrument, we search over 4,000 combinations of flights between cities on 
expedia.com for mid-week, non-holiday dates. Expedia compares flight times and 
provides a minimum flight time, simplifying the travel time search information. Our 
measure, flight times, is the flight time (expressed in 100s of minutes) to the city of origin 
from the prior-year university minus the flight time to the origin from the potential 
university. If the difference in flight times is a positive number, reflecting a move closer 
to home, there should be a higher probability of being in that location. 
Another fairly obvious instrument is prior location.  Because of transaction costs 
in moving, the prior year location should have high predictive power for the current 
location. Using prior location as an instrument should not confound the selection of 
university with productivity. Consider the individual whose move is undertaken either 
with the intent to change her own productivity or to match her characteristics better with 
a potential school. For such an individual, the prior location instrument has no predictive 
power on potential location.   
Because some schools attract back their best former students, our third 
instrument, PhD School Location, is a dummy variable equal to one if the potential 
university is the Ph.D. alma mater and the faculty is at one of the top five universities. 
Universities generally do not hire their own students in the job market, so we set this 
variable equal to one only if the person has more than two years in career experience.   
The fourth instrument is the productivity distance between the individual’s prior 
two years of work and the potential schools’ average individual productivity over the 
same period. Because untenured faculty with below-average productivity can be fired and 
faculty with above-average productivity can be hired away, we use the absolute value of 
the difference in productivity to each potential school as the metric for assistant and 
associate professors. Full professors, unlike their assistant and associate colleagues, 
cannot be fired but they can be recruited away. Full professors generally are recruited 
when their productivity is above the recruiting school’s average. Therefore, we use the 
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unadjusted differences between the individual and the potential school as productivity 
distance measure for full professors. We also interact productivity distance with each 
position rank to take full benefit from the varying predictions by rank. 
Table 7 presents the selection model estimates of model (3). The first stage 
estimates are shown in panels A and B. The second stage estimates and the university 
fixed effects coefficients are in panels C and D.  
The first stage instruments perform very well. In panel A, the LRT test has a 
statistic of 541.2, indicating a high degree of relevance for age in the probability of a 
move. Panel B shows that the probability of being at a location increases significantly 
when individuals move closer to their origin. The probability of being observed at a prior 
year location is higher, reflecting the strong role of transaction costs to moving. The most 
successful individuals are more likely to be observed at their Ph.D. locations. The Ph.D. 
location effect is even stronger for the location choices that are not the prior year 
location; when individuals move, they are more likely to move to their Ph.D. alma mater. 
Faculty tend to be at a university with an average productivity similar to their own, 
regardless of their rank. Overall, our selection model fits the conditional logit model 
extremely well. With 816,624 observations, the pseudo R-square is 0.821, and the Wald 
test statistic is 42,415. 
The second stage estimation in panel C should be compared to column 2 of Table 
5, Panel A. We find results very similar to those in Table 5. Career year experience 
decreases productivity, but the bulk of the effect is loaded on the linear term in the 
selection model, not on the cubic term previously estimated. Productivity decreases 
monotonically over rank, but to a slightly lesser degree than the prior estimation.  
Turning to the central result of this paper, panel C documents that the decade 
effect of other universities, captured in the decade indicator as the offset to the 25 elite 
universities, exhibits the same positive time trend as observed in the non-selection model.  
This robustness of the decade effects to the selection model reconfirms our earlier 
repudiation of the selection stories explaining our results; that is, the dissipation of the 
university fixed effects cannot be due to selection biases. 
Panel D of Table 7 also shows that the positive university fixed effects of elite 
schools in the 1970s and the 1980s disappeared in the 1990s. The selection model, with 
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the bootstrapped standard error correction, increases the errors in estimation rendering 
many of the estimates insignificant relative to those in Table 5. However, the pattern of 
diminishing fixed effects for the elite schools is robust: for both economics and finance, 
we observe a steady decline (increase) in the number of positive (negative) signs over the 
three decades. We conclude that the dissipation of the university fixed effects in the 
1990s is robust to selection concerns.  
 
IV. Components of University Fixed Effects 
 Having established that university fixed effects existed, we attempt to explain 
what factors determine them, and why they have disappeared. We are particularly 
interested in the roles of externalities and cultural norms as determinants of these effects.  
 
A. Cross sectional components 
There are two ways to estimate the factors driving the university fixed effects. 
Method 1 takes the university fixed effects at the decade-field level θfud from Table 5, 







fud0ffud νβXβXβXβ +⋅+⋅+⋅+=θ .  (4) 
The advantage of this approach is in its ease of interpretability.  
 Method 2 inserts the same observable determinants into our original productivity 
estimating equation (2) and estimates the regression directly using the whole sample. A 
problem with Method 2 is that it understates the standard errors because the regression is 
estimated at a person-year level, and most of the regressors change only at a university-
decade level. One of the regressors, the spillover effect from colleagues, is an exception 
in that it varies by person-year, allowing us to use Method 2 to estimate the impact of the 
quality of colleagues using the whole sample. Furthermore, this externality changes for 
each person-year since the average productivity of each person’s colleagues is different 
within the same department and a fortiori over time (e.g., Moretti, 2004). Therefore, to 
estimate spillover effects, we use Method 2. To estimate the effect of the other observable 
determinants of the university fixed effect, we use Method 1.  
The quality of colleagues can generate positive externalities through the 
comments of colleagues (Laband and Tollison, 2000) and spillovers from the expertise of 
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stars (Goyal et al., 2006; Azoulay and Zivin, 2006). We are interested in if this 
externality sustained over time. As a measure of quality of colleagues we use, team, the 
two-year moving average of productivity of all productive members of the department in 
each year.23 We lag the variable one year to remove simultaneity with the productivity 
dependent variable. We allow the coefficient on team to vary by decade to test whether 
the externality changes over time. We use the same method as in (2), with impact 
productivity as the dependent variable, including individual fixed effects, and rather than 
including the university fixed effects, we include university random effects. Using 
university random effects, we can identify a team effect, part of whose variation would 
otherwise be subsumed in the university fixed effects. 
The results are presented in Table 8. The quality of colleagues has a positive and 
significant effect on productivity during the 1970s and the 1980s, but the effect turns 
negative in the 1990s. A possible explanation for the negative effect is that being 
surrounded by highly productive teammates may make a faculty overly cautious and thus 
less productive. Such an effect might have been in existence in the 1970s and 1980s but 
was overwhelmed by positive externalities.  
Consistent with the fixed effect results, the externality emanating from superior 
colleagues either disappeared or is diffused beyond the restricted boundaries of the home 
institution, e.g., to teammates at other universities. If the team effect is solely responsible 
for the elite university fixed effect, the inclusion of the team variable will eliminate all 
the positive individual university fixed effects presented in Table 5, panel B. Although 
not reported in a table, 17(18) of the university fixed effect coefficients are positive and 
significant for economics (finance) in the 1970s and only 2 (4) are positive and 
significant for the 1990s.24 Although it is possible that our measure of the colleagues 
externality is not properly captured by team, a more likely explanation is that the effect of 
highly productive colleagues alone does not fully explain the decrease in the elite 
university effect. 
                                                
23 Our definition of non-productive individuals is a person who has not published in the current or prior 
year. We exclude these individuals because later we want to capture the culture effect through these non-
productive faculty. 
24 Although we employ university random effects to identify the team effect, we switch to a fixed effects 
specification in order to identify the university fixed effect above and beyond the control for team. 
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To capture the effect of alternative variables as determinants of the unexplained 
portion of the university fixed effects, we take the residual university fixed effects after 
removing the team effect and decompose them on the basis of university characteristics 
using (4). One characteristic we use is whether a university hosts journal editors or 
houses a journal. On one hand, editors may share their know-how on crafting papers for 
publication with their colleagues, and having an in-house editor may favor the editor’s 
colleagues, whose papers might be accepted more easily (e.g, Laband and Piette, 1994b). 
On the other hand, having in-house editors may have a negative effect if editors delegate 
more refereeing to colleagues, taking their time away from the production of papers. To 
explore how these potential impacts play out, we define editors-in-house to be the natural 
log of one plus the average number of editors during each decade for the department. We 
use the natural log because editorship is clustered in a few key schools and the 
incremental impact may be decreasing. 
Another potential source of externality is the average quality of colleagues’ 
training. Faculty quality is measured as the percentage of faculty at a department whose 
Ph.D. is obtained from a top five university, where the top five designation is made by 
ranking average productivity separately for finance and economics by decade.   
In addition to externalities captured by team, editors-in-house, and faculty quality, 
cultural norms may play a role in the university fixed effects. For instance, in elite 
schools peer pressure to perform might be very strong. Our primary measure of cultural 
norms is the presence of non-productive colleagues, kindly referred to as deadwood.25 
Deadwood faculty may have a negative impact on the department’s research output by 
relieving peer pressure to produce and diverting school resources to non-research related 
activities. 26 We define deadwood as the percent of faculty who have no publication for 
two years in a row. Admittedly, this definition is a bit harsh, because the lumpy nature of 
the publication process might cause very productive faculty to be classified occasionally 
as deadwood.  
                                                
25 This variable is in the spirit of a “Bad Apples” variable in the education literature. See Hoxby (2005).  
26 Sacerdote (2001), for example, finds evidence of peer effects on individual outcomes using student living 
arrangements and subsequent grade performance at Dartmouth. Hoxby (2000) and Angrist and Lang (2004) 
study peer effects within the classroom. 
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 One may argue that deadwood and team capture the same characteristic of a 
department, with opposite signs. In fact, the correlation of deadwood and team at the 
yearly observation level is relatively low at 0.21. If high team values are driven by a few 
stars, the relation between team and deadwood would not be automatic. Additionally, 
deadwood captures the negative research environment that is not measured by a low level 
of team. 
A second measure of cultural norms within the department is measured by the 
quality of the Ph.D. program.  Presumably, a vibrant and successful Ph.D. program 
reflects the research intensity of the department.  However, faculty’s research time also 
may be absorbed by too much interaction with Ph.D. students.  We measure Ph.D. quality 
with the decade average count of students who are hired into in the top 25 schools.  
We also control for whether a university is a state school. The public or private 
nature of the institution might affect financial resources and how they are utilized. 
Finally, we want to consider the impact of two environmental variables: the 
weather and the distance to the closest metropolitan city. The former may influence 
productivity by affecting the opportunity cost of sitting in the office. We measure weather 
by the average annual snowfall. Distance may affect both the consulting and the 
distraction opportunities, but at the same time, it may also help stimulate intellectual 
curiosity by exposing faculty to topics of current interest in a timely manner. We measure 
distance as the natural log of miles to the closest city with more than three-quarters of a 
million people.  
 We are not only interested in showing cross-sectional associations between 
university fixed effects and characteristics of the departments, but also in understanding 
the negative trend in university fixed effects identified in Table 5. We examine whether 
this negative trend can be explained by changes in university characteristics over time. 
Furthermore, the relation between the university fixed effects and certain university 
characteristics may change over time. We test for this latter possibility by interacting the 
most important university characteristics with decade dummies. Our focus on the 
trending aspect of the university fixed effects heightens the concern that an omitted 
trending factor might bias our coefficients. A Breusch-Pagan test confirms this concern.27 
                                                
27 The test rejects no variance across decades with a χ2(1) = 4.72  corresponding to a p-value of 0.030. 
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Ordinarily, we would add decade fixed effects to resolve this issue. But many of our 
university characteristics vary only a little over time, so it is difficult to identify both 
decade fixed effects and university characteristics interacted with a decade dummy. Thus, 
instead of fitting a model with decade fixed effects, Table 9 presents the results with 
decade random effects. This is without loss of generality. A Hausman test fails to reject 
the equality between fixed effects and random effects estimates.28  
 Because the nature of publication productivity may not be the same across fields, 
we split the decomposition of the university fixed effects into economics (Table 9, 
columns 1 and 2) and finance (columns 3 and 4). Columns 1 and 3 in Table 9 show that 
deadwood has a strong and significant negative effect on the university fixed effect. At 
the bottom of the table, a partial R-square analysis shows that excluding deadwood from 
the estimating equation lowers the percentage of variation explained by 6% (from 21%) 
in economics and by 29% (from 42%) in finance.  These results indicate that norms play 
a role in organizational productivity. The magnitude of the coefficients, significance, and 
partial R-squares are greater in finance than in economics. A possible explanation for this 
difference is that finance consulting and executive teaching opportunities tend to be more 
financially rewarding than the policy-related consulting opportunities for most 
economists.  
The existence of in-house editors has a negative sign on the productivity of 
colleagues in economics and finance, but is significant only for finance. The negative 
aspects of in-house editorship seem to outweigh the positive ones. The net effect is 
stronger for finance, perhaps because the burden of having an in-house editor is shared by 
a larger number of colleagues in economics than in finance. 
The percentage of faculty with Ph.D. degrees from top five universities is 
positively significant for economics and insignificant for finance. The Ph.D. program 
quality seems to impose more burdens than to provide benefits, but only for economics 
departments. The proximity to cities, some of which include financial centers, seems to 
have a positive effect on finance faculty productivity. These three variables, however, do 
                                                
28The test rejects fails to reject equivalence of the fixed effects and random effects coefficients with a 
χ2(8) = 6.74  corresponding to a p-value of 0.556. 
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not explain much of the variation across departments; therefore, we are reluctant to draw 
definitive inferences based on the regression results.   
Being a state school does not seem to have an impact on the university fixed 
effect. Snowfall is not significant. We expected a positive coefficient in that good weather 
might make leisure relatively more attractive. The result does not change when we 
replace snowfall with average January temperatures. 
In columns 2 and 4, we allow the effect of deadwood and editors to vary over 
decades. The effect of deadwood is stable over time, in both economics and finance. The 
stability of cultural norms suggests that unlike the externality of having productive 
colleagues, the cultural aspects of institutions do not easily dissipate with technological 
change. When nonproductive faculty members are protected by the university tenure 
system, there is no easy cure for a lack of intellectual stimulation, a low motivational 
work environment, or an overly consulting-oriented environment. 
 The externality impact of editorship seems to decline, as does the externality of 
productive colleagues. In economics departments (column 2), the effect of editors begins 
as positive in the 1970s and becomes insignificant in the 1990s. In finance departments 
(column 4), in-house editors begins as insignificant in the 1970s and turns negative in the 
1990s. Both cases suggest a reduction in the positive externality.  
 
B. Diffusion and Technology Advancements 
We show that the favorable impact on productivity of working at elite universities 
diminishes since the 1970s. We also show that the importance of colleague externalities 
vanishes in the 1990s, while the influence of cultural norms remains persistently strong.    
To what extent is the progress in information technology responsible for these 
trends?  Technological advancement can facilitate communication and transfer of ideas 
among co-authors at a distance. It can also facilitate access to knowledge itself, 
particularly for universities far from the forefront of research. But can we document the 
magnitude of this effect in practice?  
 The reduction in the impact of higher-quality colleagues is consistent with the 
reduction of geographical boundaries through better communication technology. Several 
papers (Laband and Tollison, 2000; Hamermesh and Oster, 2002; Rosenblat and Mobius, 
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2004; Goyal et al., 2006; Azoulay and Zivin, 2006) document dramatic increases in co-
authoring at a distance in the latter part of the twentieth century. In particular, Goyal et al. 
show that the proportion of the economics profession networked through co-authorship 
has increased from nearly 20% in the 1970s to 50% in the 1990s. Our additional 
contribution to this literature is to document that most of the increases in co-authorship 
took place between elite universities and non-elite ones.  
We take the 25,010 author-article observations from the 41 journals with at least 
one author residing at a top 25 school and weigh each observation with 1/number of 
authors so that articles will have equal weight. The articles are divided into four types; S 
= solo articles, X = co-authored articles with all co-authors within the same school, Y = 
co-authored articles with at least one co-author not from the same school but all from a 
top 25 school, and Z = co-authored articles with at least one co-author outside the top 25 
schools. Figure 4 plots the percentage of the four types of papers in our dataset.  The 
results are striking. The percentage of multiple author papers with co-authors from 
outside the elite schools has steadily increased from about 32% in the beginning of the 
1970s, nearly doubling to 61% by 2004. Papers co-authored with outside authors within 
the elite schools also increased from 3% to 9%.  These increases contrast sharply with the 
steady decline in solo authored papers (from 66% to 24%) and essentially no change for 
in-house co-authored papers (hovering around 6%). This evidence is consistent with 
internet and information technology advancements that make access at a distance easier, 
which disproportionately favors non-elite universities. The advancements in information 
technology include not only the internet, but also advancements in non-postal delivery 
systems, such as overnight mail service and fax machines. These earlier developments 
may explain the graduate increase in co-authorship rather a sudden sharp increase that 
might be expected if the internet were the only advancement in technology and everyone 
adopted email use at the same time. 
To investigate whether the sharp increase in participation by scholars in non-elite 
schools is due to an increase in the publication market share of others schools, we 
compare the percentage of all articles published in the 41 journals with at least one author 
affiliated with the top 25 schools with the percentage of articles written exclusively by 
authors in others schools in our dataset. There is no evidence of a change in market share 
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between elite and non-elite schools.  The percentage of articles with top school 
participation oscillates between 19% and 27%, without a discernable trend, and the 
participation by exclusively non-elite school scholars oscillates between 73% and 81%.  
A similar lack of pattern holds when we look at market share weighted by the impact of 
journals in which the articles were published. 
In sum, the available evidence suggests that the reduction in the university fixed 
effect is due to a diffusion of the externality produced by better colleagues beyond the 
physical limits of a university.   
 
C. Impact on Salaries 
Why does it matter that physical location affects productivity?  Although the 
diminishing benefits from physical location have many important implications 
concerning jobs, outsourcing, migration, regulation, competition policy, education, etc., 
in this section we focus on its implication to wages, specifically, on the appropriability of 
the externality. If the externality generated by a better faculty is concentrated within the 
physical boundaries of a university, the university can capture some of it.  In other words, 
if a faculty member’s productivity benefits tremendously from being at Chicago, she 
might be willing to accept a lower salary to be at Chicago and benefit from this 
externality.  If that externality diminishes, so should the discount in salary.  Hence, 
universities with reductions in their fixed effect should experience higher increases in 
salaries.  In other words, faculty salary should be negatively correlated with changes in 
the university fixed effects. 
Although we are unable to obtain time series data for economics and finance 
professors salary, the National Center of Education Statistics of the U. S. Department of 
Education, conducts faculty salary surveys for all the faculties in U.S. colleges and 
universities on a yearly or biennial basis. The data are compiled into the Higher 
Education General Information Survey (HEGIS) series for years 1968-1986 and the 
Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) series for 1987-2000. The 
surveys collect salary information by gender, position, and contract length (nine- or ten-
month versus full-year contracts) for faculty in all fields. For comparability across time, 
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we take the average salary across gender for nine- or ten-month contracts of assistant, 
associate, and full professors.  
While we do not expect that all departments are affected in the same way by 
information technology changes, such changes are likely to affect the externalities in the 
production process of research for a substantial portion of the university faculty. Hence, 
we examine the relation between salaries and the university fixed effects. To this end, we 
regress the change in salary (by rank) at each of the twenty-five elite institutions over the 
three decades on the change in the university fixed effects for economics faculty. We do 
not include finance because finance faculty enjoyed unusually large salary increases over 
the past three decades and business schools often have separate budgets which may lead 
to distinct salary structures. 
To equilibrate the quality of the faculty input, we control for the change in the 
average individual productivity, proxied by the decade-department average of each 
individual’s fixed effects. We fit the estimation in a seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUR) framework across rank status to account for outside relationships of errors among 
the ranks. 
As predicted, Table 10 reports that changes in the university fixed effects have a 
negative and statistically significant effect on salary.29 This relation is robust across 
ranks.  The results suggest that for each AER impact page decline in the university fixed 
effects, assistant professors’ salaries increase by $1,386; associate professors’ by $1,750; 
and full professors’ by $2917.30  
In sum, the salary evidence is consistent with leading universities becoming 
relatively less attractive places to work in the last three decades. This salary effect 
appears to be driven, at least in part, by a reduction in the university fixed effect.   
 
V. Conclusion 
In this paper we study the nature and the magnitude of production externalities in 
research at elite U.S. universities. We find strong positive externalities emanating from 
                                                
29 The observation count of 94 is smaller than the combination of having three ranks, twenty-five schools, 
and two changes across time because of missing data for Canada and some missing 1970s observations in 
HEGIS. 
30 The monotonic decline in R-squares, from 6% for assistant professors to 1% for full professors, is due 
partly to the much larger variance in salaries for higher-ranked faculty. 
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superior colleagues during the 1970s. This effect has disappeared today. The dissipation 
can be attributed in some part to the diffusion of the externality beyond universities’ 
physical boundaries. An important factor behind this change appears to be the internet 
revolution, and more generally, advances in information technology. These advances 
diminish the importance of cooperation within physical boundaries and greatly facilitate 
collaboration from distance. As a result, there has been a substantial increase in co-
authorship between scholars at elite and other universities.  
Cultural norms, however, have a persistent effect on production. The presence of 
non-productive faculty members, a proxy for a low motivational work environment, has a 
strong negative impact on the productivity of the other faculty members. The bad 
influence of non-productive colleagues seems to extend well beyond the opportunity cost 
of positions occupied by unproductive employees. 
The disappearance of positive university fixed effects suggests that, as far as 
research productivity is concerned, elite universities are indeed losing their competitive 
edge. Because of the reduced importance of personal interactions, one traditional 
advantage of elite universities - to act as a focal point attracting the smartest faculty - is at 
risk. Furthermore, the negative relation between changes in university fixed effects and 
salary changes suggests that elite universities with low externalities are no longer able to 
retain star faculty on the strength of their reputation alone. Upcoming universities now 
compete on a more level playing field to attract productive faculty. 
These results have implications for knowledge-based industries. An increasing 
fraction of production in developed countries consists of research-like products. If, as our 
evidence suggests, the physical location of production is less important today for these 
products, the nature of these firms and the way they should be managed is fundamentally 
changed. When physical proximity is required for externality, firms exercise authority 
over their employees by controlling access to the physical premises (Rajan and Zingales, 
1998, 2001). As a result, our findings suggest that in knowledge-based industries, the 
boundaries of firms are becoming fuzzier. Through technological advancement these 
industries are losing a powerful instrument to regulate and control the accumulation and 
utilization of knowledge. As a consequence, appropriating returns to investment in 
research and development will become more difficult, tilting the playing field in favor of 
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the key generators of knowledge and holders of property rights, i.e., superstar researchers 
and knowledge coordinators.31 
The implication of fuzzier firm boundaries goes beyond industries that specialize 
in research-like products. Disruptions will, of course, vary across type of industry. When 
economies of scale and physical interactions are important as in traditional 
manufacturing, the pace and scope of transformation will be curtailed. However, 
industries that rely heavily on human capital and expertise, such as financial services and 
entertainment, may find centralizing their production in core locations, such as New York 
and Hollywood, to be increasingly less important. What we have documented for 
universities has also been happening in other industries. Back office operations are 
increasingly outsourced overseas. Industries that can provide service over the internet 
(e.g., real estate brokering) are breaking out of traditional modes of operation. Our results 
suggest that these breakdowns are only the tip of the iceberg; in the not-so-distant future, 
many industries may find little need for locational anchors at all.  
At the macro level, our results suggest that countries leading in technology may 
find it difficult to sustain their competitive advantage. Advances in information 
technology facilitate easier, low cost access to the technological frontier for researchers 
and knowledge coordinators worldwide, providing them an opportunity to challenge the 
leadership roles in knowledge-based industries in a relatively short span of time. 
                                                
31 This might explain the surge in the return to human capital in the top 0.1% of the income distribution 




We discuss the restrictions on θrfut necessary to identify the model.  At the risk of 
being over-conservative, we begin with the full expansion of θrfut: 
θrfut = θr + θf + θu + θt + θrf + θru + θrt + θfu + θft + θut + θrfu + θrft + θrut + θfut + θrfut  
The key effect in which we are interested is the effect of university departments on 
productivity over time, θfut.   
Since faculty rosters are not sufficiently large to estimate the university effect at 
the year level (and productivity is noisy even at a year level as the fruits of research do 
not flow consistently), we focus on the decade (d: d∈ 1970s, 1980s, 1990s including 
2000-2001) rather than year effect of universities.  So we begin by imposing:  
R.1: θt = θd   
R.2: θft = θfd  
From our analysis of “inflation”, we have determined that a page of impact productivity 
should roughly be the same across time.  Thus, any systematic time effect captured in θt 
should be sufficiently small that measuring it at a decade level (rather than at a year level) 
should be inconsequential. R.2 requires that this assumption holds within each subfield 
(economics and finance).32  
Building on R.1 and R.2, we impose that any university effect, field effect, or 
university field effect that varies over time can be measured at a decade level without 
inducing a bias in θfud: 
R.3.: θut = θud  
R.4.: θfut = θfud 
For a bias to exist, it must be either that the step pattern of applying a decade restriction is 
correlated with another variable which does exhibit lumpy changes or that the ad-hoc 
slicing of time at the calendar decade end impacts estimation because university effects 
are non-monotonic.  For example, say a department effect is constant for 1970-1974, 
improves from 1975-1984 and declines from 1985-1989.  A decade study might miss 
                                                
32 This assumption is needed in spite of R1 because the year effects for finance and economics could offset 
each other within decades.   
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such effect.  However, in our defense, the pattern of university impacts is likely to be a 
slow-moving monotonic trend since the effect of any individual is removed from the 
analysis.  Nevertheless, to ensure that our results are robust to this assumption, we also 
estimate a model that allows the university field effect to trend over time.  
 The remaining restrictions ensure that our estimated university effects are not 
driven by a changing effect of rank over time (R.5-R.7), across fields (R.8-R.9), or across 
time-fields (R.10). 
R.5.: θrf = 0 
R.6.: θrt = 0 
R.7.: θrft = 0 
Since the procedures embedded in the tenure system are universal across fields, there 
would be no reason to expect the rank effect to vary by field.  R.5. is easy to test.  As in 
R.5., the restriction of no changing rank effect over time (R.6.) is a facet of the static 
nature of the tenure system.  Thus, we would not expect the rank effect to vary over time.  
R.7 becomes innocuous after assuming R.5 and R.6 and accepting that there would be no 
reason for rank effects not to vary over time or over fields but to have a non-zero field-
time covariance. 
R.8.: θru = 0  
R.9.: θrfu = 0 
 R.8. restricts rank effects to be the same across schools.  In robustness checks, we 
allow rank effects to vary by school.  R.9 adds that, given that we are allowing university 
effects to vary over schools, any variation does not depend on rank.  Beyond the effect of 
varying rank effects across schools captured in the two-way interaction in R.8, R.9 is 
unlikely to be violated except in cases in which the standards for an economics 
department are widely different from those of a finance department within a school.  
R.10: θrut = 0 
We would like to be able to conduct our analysis allowing the university effect 
over time to vary across schools and across school ranks within each school. The number 
of faculty in assistant and associate positions who move within a decade is, however, not 
sufficiently large to estimate a university-rank effect even by decade.  Because it is 
plausible that a university pattern which we encounter is driven by a time pattern in the 
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effect of rank pressures varying across schools, we repeat all of our results for a 
breakdown of full professors versus those still seeking some level of promotion. 
 Finally, the 4-way interaction θrfut becomes innocuous since we are interested in 
analyzing an interaction at a lower level of aggregation.  Any possible bias in our 
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Figure 1: Journal –Specific Time Lags in the Writing to Publication Process 
Time from writing a paper to publication in a journal consist of three parts – time from the project 
commencement to journal submission, time from journal submission to acceptance, and time from 
acceptance to publication.  The Sampled solid line is the time in months from submission to publication for 
publications in the Review of Economic Studies (Panel A) and Journal of Financial Economics (Panel B) 
from an average of 15 articles per year for 1970-2002.  The Ellison dashed black line is the interpolated 
decade-average time from submission to acceptance for these journals as reported in Ellison (2002).  The 
Ellison + 1 Year dashed grey line represents a one year addition to Ellison to account for the time from the 
midpoint in writing the paper to submission plus the time from acceptance to publication. 
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Figure 2: Average Individual Annual Productivity by Career Years 
 
An individual’s raw productivity is measured as the AER equivalent pages for that person for the year in 
which the article productivity was written, using the Ellison adjustment plus one year to lag from the 
publication dates of articles to the writing time period.  Career years is the number of years since the 
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Figure 3, Panel A: University Fixed Effects over Decades for Economics 
Departments 
 
University fixed effects coefficients are taken from the 2nd column estimation of Table 5, panel A, with 
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Figure 3, Panel B: University Fixed Effects over Decades for Finance Departments 
 
University fixed effects coefficients are taken from the 2nd column estimation of Table 5, panel A, with 
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Figure 4: Patterns in Co-Authorship 
 
For all articles published in the top 41 journals with at least one author residing at a top 25 school, 
presented are the percentages of articles falling into one of four types: s = solo articles (black dotted line), x 
= co-authored articles with all co-authors within the same school (black solid line), y = co-authored articles 
with at least one outside co-author but within the top 25 schools (grey dotted line), and z = co-authored 
articles with at least one outside co-author outside of the top 25 schools (grey solid line).     
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Table 1, Panel A: Studies Ranking University Research 
 
 
Study Field Sub-Period Methodology 
Graves et al. 
American Economic 
Review (1982) 
Economics 1974-1978 Calculates AER equivalent pages. 
 




Economics 1978-1981 Counts average number of citations in SSCI. 
National Research Council 
(1983) Economics 1983 
Employs methodology based on subjective 
evaluation of raters plus considerations of an 
institution’s graduates, library, R&D budget, 
and program and faculty output. 
 
Scott and Mitias 
Economic Inquiry (1996) 
 
Economics 1984-1993 Calculates AER equivalents pages. Divides by number of coauthors. 
 
Dusansky and Vernon 




Weights AER pages by Laband-Piette (1994) 







Calculates impact factor (citations/ 
#articles) for each journal. Divides by 






Uses top 10 journals of KMS (1999). Uses 
Laband Piette (1994) long-term impact 
factor. Divides by coauthors. 
Klemkosky & Tuttle 
Journal of Finance (1977) Finance 1966-1975 
 
Chooses all articles in primary finance 
journals and articles in secondary list that 
meet the criterion: “Would the JF or JFQA 
consider this article or note suitable for 
publication in terms of subject matter?”  




Journal of Finance (1987) Finance 1975-1986 
Counts number of pages for articles.  Divides 
by number of co-authors. 
Borokhovich et al. 
Journal of Finance (1995) Finance 1989-1993 
 
Weights pages by journal impact factor 
constructed with the number of citations for 
the journal.  Divides by number of co-
authors. 
 
Chan, Chin and Steiner 
Financial Management 
(2002) 
Finance 1996-2001 Converts pages to JF page equivalents.  Divides by number of co-authors. 
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Table 1, Panel B: Research Rankings of Universities 
 
 
Rank University Borda Count Score 
1 University of Chicago 17.74 
2 University of Pennsylvania 17.19 
3 Harvard University 16.94 
4 New York University 13.05 
5 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 12.98 
6 Stanford University 12.89 
7 Northwestern University 11.83 
8 University of California at Los Angeles 11.70 
9 University of Michigan 10.54 
10 Columbia University 9.10 
11 University of Rochester 7.74 
12 University of California at Berkeley 7.59 
13 Yale University 6.78 
14 Princeton University 6.20 
15 Ohio State University 5.60 
16 Cornell University 5.36 
17 University of Wisconsin 5.32 
18 Duke University 4.63 
19 University of British Columbia 2.39 
20 Purdue University 2.28 
21 University of Washington 2.13 
22 Indiana University 1.91 
23 University of Texas at Austin 1.81 
24 Carnegie-Mellon University 1.79 
25 University of Southern California 1.71 
26 Boston University 1.42 
27 University of Illinois 1.36 
28 University of California at San Diego 1.33 
29 University of Minnesota 1.18 
30 University of Maryland 0.98 
31 Johns Hopkins 0.63 
32 London School of Business 0.63 
33 Rutgers University 0.63 
34 Boston College 0.51 
35 University of Pittsburgh 0.50 
36 London School of Economics 0.43 
37 University of North Carolina 0.42 
38 Louisiana State University 0.27 
39 Virginia Polytechnique University 0.22 
40 University of Iowa 0.21 
41 University of Toronto 0.20 
42 Hong Kong Polytechnique University 0.18 
43 Brown University 0.17 
44 Oxford University 0.13 
45 California Institute of Technology 0.10 
46 University of Virginia 0.08 
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Table 2: Impact Factors and Decade Impact Rankings  
 
 1970s 1980s 1990s 
Journal 







American Economic Review 1.00 (1) 1.00 (2) 1.00 (1) 
Journal of Political Economy 0.93 (2) 0.75 (4) 0.72 (5) 
Journal of Financial Economics 0.85 (3) 1.04 (1) 0.88 (3) 
Review of Economics and Statistics 0.74 (4) 0.43 (11) 0.51 (7) 
Econometrica 0.71 (5) 0.89 (3) 0.49 (8) 
Review of Economic Studies 0.69 (6) 0.59 (9) 0.67 (6) 
Rand Journal of Economics\Bell 0.61 (7) 0.66 (6) 0.41 (9) 
Journal of Finance 0.60 (8) 0.60 (8) 0.96 (2) 
Journal of Monetary Economics 0.58 (9) 0.75 (5) 0.37 (11) 
International Economic Review 0.49 (10) 0.27 (22) 0.33 (16) 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 0.43 (11) 0.62 (7) 0.80 (4) 
Journal of American Statistical Association 0.43 (12) 0.37 (14) 0.34 (15) 
Journal of Economic Theory 0.43 (13) 0.37 (15) 0.17 (29) 
Journal of Public Economics 0.42 (14) 0.28 (20) 0.27 (21) 
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 0.40 (15) 0.39 (13) 0.32 (17) 
National Tax Journal 0.40 (16) 0.16 (33) 0.28 (20) 
Journal of Econometrics 0.35 (17) 0.29 (18) 0.24 (25) 
Journal of International Economics 0.33 (18) 0.43 (12) 0.35 (13) 
Economic Inquiry 0.32 (19) 0.27 (23) 0.15 (33) 
Journal of Business 0.31 (20) 0.37 (16) 0.30 (19) 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 0.30 (21) 0.23 (28) 0.31 (18) 
Journal of Human Resources 0.29 (22) 0.15 (35) 0.24 (26) 
Journal of Urban Economics 0.28 (23) 0.17 (31) 0.13 (36) 
Economica 0.27 (24) 0.22 (30) 0.17 (31) 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 0.26 (25) 0.28 (21) 0.35 (14) 
Journal of Law and Economics 0.21 (26) 0.26 (24) 0.16 (32) 
Southern Economic Journal 0.20 (27) 0.16 (34) 0.08 (38) 
Economic Journal 0.18 (28) 0.23 (29) 0.20 (27) 
Journal of Legal Studies 0.16 (29) 0.24 (26) 0.12 (37) 
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 0.14 (30) 0.15 (36) 0.15 (34) 
Oxford Economic Papers 0.13 (31) 0.12 (40) 0.15 (35) 
Journal of Economic History 0.13 (32) 0.13 (37) 0.07 (39) 
Journal of Regional Science 0.13 (33) 0.12 (39) 0.07 (40) 
European Economic Review 0.12 (34) 0.17 (32) 0.26 (24) 
Journal of Development Economics 0.10 (35) 0.13 (38) 0.19 (28) 
Economic Development and Cultural Change 0.09 (36) 0.05 (41) 0.06 (41) 
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics --  0.51 (10) 0.39 (10) 
Review of Financial Studies --  0.32 (17) 0.36 (12) 
Journal of Labor Economics --  0.29 (19) 0.26 (22) 
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization --  0.24 (27) 0.26 (23) 
Journal of International Money and Finance --  0.26 (25) 0.17 (30) 
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Table 3, Summary Statistics & Correlations for Individual Productivity Measures 
 
Panel A presents the mean, median, maximum and standard deviation for our 4 measures of productivity. 
Panels B and C present Spearman Rank Correlation and Pearson Correlation among the four productivity 
measures. Impact and raw productivities are measured as the count of AER equivalent pages written by 
each faculty in 41 economics and finance journals. Adjustment to AER equivalents normalizes by font, 
typesetting and average article length.  Publication pages are divided by 1/n coauthors. Impact productivity 
multiplies each article by the decade impact factor of the journal published given in Table 2. Article counts 
is the simple sum of articles published by year. Citations sums the count of cites received as of May 2005 
for each article written by the faculty in that year.  
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
 
Productivity Decade Mean Median Max St. Dev. 
Raw 1970s 5.8 0 105.4 10.1 
 1980s 6.7 0 112.7 11.5 
 1990s 6.2 0 138.4 11.9 
 Overall 6.3 0 138.4 11.5 
Impact 1970s 3.2 0 74.6 6.2 
 1980s 3.4 0 70.1 6.5 
 1990s 3.0 0 103.9 6.3 
 Overall 3.1 0 103.9 6.3 
Article Counts 1970s 0.75 0 9 1.10 
 1980s 0.70 0 13 1.05 
 1990s 0.53 0 8 0.89 
 Overall 0.62 0 13 0.99 
Citations 1970s 27.5 0 3467 120.1 
 1980s 25.7 0 3396 92.8 
 1990s 7.8 0 693 28.8 
 Overall 16.7 0 3467 75.3 
 
Panel B: Spearman Rank Correlation 
 
 Impact Raw Article Count Citations 
Impact 1    
Raw 0.981 1   
Article Counts 0.969 0.974 1  
Citations 0.862 0.851 0.860 1 
 
Panel C: Pearson Correlation 
 
 Impact Raw Article Count Citations 
Impact 1    
Raw 0.871 1   
Article Counts 0.783 0.850 1  
Citations 0.421 0.357 0.401 1 
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Table 4 – Average Individual Productivities for Faculty by University and Decade 
 
Individual raw productivity is measured as the count of AER equivalent pages written by each faculty in 41 
economics and finance journals.  Adjustment to AER equivalents requires normalizing by font, typesetting 
and average article length such to equilibrate words across journals.  Publication pages are divided by 1/n 
coauthors.  Impact productivity multiplies each article by the decade impact factor of the journal published 
given in Table 2. Article count is the simple sum of articles published by year. The 1990s decade includes 
2000 and 2001. The Others category reports the productivity of individuals who have ever been or will be 
at top 25 universities but who are at non-top 25 universities for that year observation. The method for 
determining the top 25 universities is discussed in the data section and Table 1. All averages are averages 
over faculty in the set of universities, not raw averages across universities. 
 
 Impact Productivity Raw Productivity Article Counts 
 1970s 1980s 1990s 1970s 1980s 1990s 1970s 1980s 1990s 
MIT 5.89 6.24 6.40 9.90 11.13 11.56 1.26 1.13 0.97 
Chicago 5.54 5.69 5.69 8.85 9.62 9.66 0.99 0.94 0.80 
OSU 5.09 3.39 4.01 8.87 6.98 7.99 1.14 0.83 0.75 
Harvard 4.89 4.35 4.97 8.44 8.20 8.72 0.94 0.92 0.80 
Carnegie 4.49 4.60 2.47 7.28 8.51 5.15 0.93 0.90 0.49 
Rochester 4.46 4.47 3.21 7.26 7.80 6.20 0.77 0.78 0.52 
UCLA 4.21 4.78 3.90 7.41 8.98 8.12 0.96 0.93 0.69 
Yale 4.13 3.69 2.97 7.29 7.51 6.85 0.83 0.79 0.56 
Princeton 3.81 6.95 5.54 6.88 12.02 9.93 0.92 1.27 0.84 
Penn 3.64 3.68 4.01 6.61 6.91 7.88 0.82 0.77 0.74 
Stanford 3.59 4.39 4.03 6.36 7.90 7.39 0.86 0.83 0.61 
Columbia 2.99 2.56 2.51 5.02 5.65 5.21 0.69 0.61 0.46 
UBC 2.77 2.46 2.44 5.48 5.28 5.79 0.74 0.60 0.50 
Northwestern 2.56 3.80 3.33 4.77 7.06 7.13 0.63 0.73 0.61 
Berkeley 2.56 2.63 2.72 4.34 5.25 5.95 0.52 0.65 0.53 
NYU 2.49 2.22 2.86 4.59 4.04 5.23 0.74 0.53 0.53 
Purdue 2.48 2.00 1.97 5.17 4.12 3.56 0.86 0.55 0.40 
Michigan 2.19 3.03 2.43 4.05 5.33 5.32 0.61 0.61 0.48 
Washington 2.08 2.33 1.69 4.22 4.75 4.61 0.48 0.51 0.41 
Wisconsin 1.96 1.97 2.58 4.14 4.52 6.06 0.59 0.54 0.53 
USC 1.96 1.93 2.53 3.70 4.69 5.64 0.52 0.48 0.50 
Cornell 1.87 2.48 2.10 4.15 5.82 5.22 0.59 0.72 0.47 
Indiana 1.61 1.56 1.40 3.82 3.25 3.69 0.45 0.38 0.34 
Duke 0.97 2.72 2.47 2.35 5.81 5.06 0.41 0.62 0.43 
Texas 0.39 0.97 1.97 0.87 2.21 4.44 0.12 0.26 0.36 
Top 25  3.34 3.63 3.43 5.96 6.87 6.80 0.76 0.75 0.60 
Others 2.79 2.33 2.03 5.25 5.16 4.83 0.72 0.61 0.45 
All Schools 3.20 3.23 2.91 5.78 6.34 6.07 0.75 0.70 0.54 





Table 5, Panel A: Determinants of Faculty Productivity 
 
Observations are at the individual-year level. Impact and raw productivities are measured as the count of AER 
equivalent pages written by each faculty in 41 economics and finance journals. Adjustment to AER equivalents 
normalizes by font, typesetting and average article length.  Publication pages are divided by 1/n coauthors. Impact 
productivity multiplies each article by the decade impact factor of the journal published given in Table 2. Article count 
is the simple sum of articles published by year.  The 1990s decade includes 2000 and 2001. Career years is the years 
since Ph.D. Associate and Full Professor, Chaired, and Visiting are indicator variables for the position of the faculty.  
Editor impact is the sum of the impact factors for the journals for which the faculty serves as an editor or co-editor.  All 
columns include individual fixed effects.  Columns 2, 4 and 6 add university-field fixed effects.  Article counts are 
estimated with Poisson Regression.  T-statistics are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels respectively.  
 
Dependent Variable: Impact Productivity Raw Productivity Article Count 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Career Years -0.010 0.007 0.099 0.123 0.045*** 0.046*** 
 (0.28) (0.21) (1.16) (1.45) (6.01) (6.04) 
Career Years^2 -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.015*** -0.018*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (2.88) (3.69) (3.35) (3.83) (11.04) (11.10) 
Career Years^3 (in 1,000s) 0.101*** 0.138*** 0.242*** 0.297*** 0.070*** 0.072*** 
 (2.99) (3.84) (3.19) (3.69) (9.00) (9.16) 
Associate Professor -0.487*** -0.455*** -1.131*** -1.022*** -0.138*** -0.128*** 
 (3.09) (2.78) (3.43) (3.07) (4.91) (4.45) 
Full Professor -0.895*** -0.876*** -1.946*** -1.841*** -0.237*** -0.224*** 
 (4.36) (3.78) (5.29) (4.81) (6.42) (5.93) 
Chaired Full Professor -1.260*** -1.055*** -2.515*** -2.184*** -0.190*** -0.172*** 
 (5.55) (4.50) (6.37) (5.37) (4.23) (3.72) 
Editor Impact -0.038 -0.039 -0.142 -0.162 0.045 0.029 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.11) (0.13) (0.78) (0.49) 
Visiting 0.028 0.034 0.161 0.163 0.051* 0.037 
 (0.33) (0.42) (0.91) (0.96) (1.79) (1.26) 
Decade 1980s 0.180 0.481** 0.841*** 1.528*** 0.042 0.108** 
 (1.60) (2.42) (3.98) (4.76) (1.36) (2.28) 
Decade 1990s 0.237 1.116*** 1.282*** 2.831*** 0.055 0.200*** 
 (1.44) (2.79) (3.49) (4.08) (1.11) (3.24) 
Finance*Decade1970s -1.278** -0.756 -0.470 0.835 0.319 0.333 
 (2.47) (0.90) (0.52) (0.65) (1.60) (1.47) 
Finance*Decade1980s -1.126** -0.387 -0.939 0.470 0.032 0.027 
 (2.29) (0.49) (1.06) (0.39) (0.17) (0.13) 
Finance*Decade1990s -0.975* -0.434 -1.190 -0.023 -0.170 -0.271 
 (1.78) (0.55) (1.24) (0.02) (0.88) (1.27) 
Constant 4.817*** 4.017*** 7.983*** 6.287***   
 (13.99) (12.33) (13.54) (13.59)   
Observations 35,917 35,917 35,917 35,917 35,917 35,917 
F-Test (p-value) for 







Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
University Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
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Table 5, Panel B: University Fixed Effects across Decades and Field 
 
University fixed effects estimates for the impact productivity estimation from Table 5, panel A, column 2.  
 
 Dependent Variable: Impact Productivity 
 Economics Departments Finance Departments 
  1970s 1980s 1990s 1970s 1980s 1990s 
Carnegie Mellon -1.190*** 0.432* -0.109 1.717*** 0.550 -1.062* 
 (4.89) (1.90) (0.56) (4.25) (1.06) (1.90) 
Columbia 1.077*** -0.044 -0.847* 1.174*** -0.227 -0.347** 
 (3.96) (0.13) (1.94) (8.43) (1.06) (2.03) 
Cornell -0.499** -0.332 -0.255 -0.045 -0.937*** -0.551 
 (2.34) (0.90) (0.68) (0.11) (4.44) (1.06) 
Duke -0.401* 0.367 -0.619*** -0.535*** 0.233* -0.656*** 
 (1.84) (1.64) (2.86) (2.62) (1.95) (4.78) 
Harvard 2.127*** 0.250 -1.781*** -2.249*** -2.114*** -2.781** 
 (11.33) (1.00) (5.53) (3.90) (3.33) (2.30) 
Indiana 0.349*** 0.819*** 0.149 1.846*** -0.883*** 0.246** 
 (2.65) (4.73) (0.87) (29.39) (3.39) (2.36) 
MIT 1.003*** 0.560*** -1.208*** 1.533* 0.819 -0.128 
 (5.28) (3.10) (3.30) (1.92) (0.81) (0.20) 
New York U -0.307 -0.300 -0.279 1.457*** 0.340** 0.991*** 
 (0.95) (0.67) (0.59) (10.99) (1.97) (7.95) 
Northwestern 0.892*** 1.377*** 0.351 0.427* 0.743*** -0.253 
 (5.59) (6.68) (1.01) (1.75) (3.47) (0.75) 
Ohio State U 1.535*** -0.348* -0.892*** 2.365*** -0.181 -0.270 
 (7.48) (1.68) (3.22) (11.58) (0.69) (0.47) 
Princeton 1.220*** 1.530*** -0.439    
 (4.16) (4.81) (0.96)    
Purdue -0.276 -0.911*** -0.821*** 0.952** 1.396** 0.056 
 (0.50) (3.49) (2.59) (2.24) (2.18) (0.11) 
Stanford 1.313*** 0.332 -1.074*** 1.193*** 2.719*** 1.141** 
 (7.62) (1.25) (3.29) (3.83) (6.82) (2.17) 
U British Columbia 0.564*** 0.196 0.415* 3.285*** 0.320 0.497 
 (2.61) (0.80) (1.80) (3.01) (1.29) (1.49) 
UC Berkeley -0.475** -0.147 -0.932*** 0.214 -0.866** -0.319 
 (2.32) (0.56) (3.29) (0.64) (2.26) (0.94) 
UC Los Angeles 1.425*** 0.635 -0.345 2.025*** 0.987** 0.508* 
 (3.61) (1.56) (1.11) (11.25) (2.26) (1.72) 
U of Chicago 1.796*** 0.889*** -0.463 2.466*** 1.465*** -0.460 
 (8.66) (2.91) (1.56) (12.08) (6.12) (1.19) 
U of Michigan 0.892*** 1.149*** 0.357* 1.259*** 1.001*** -0.621** 
 (6.10) (7.56) (1.74) (4.19) (3.11) (2.17) 
U of Pennsylvania 1.217*** 0.868*** -0.167 0.591*** -0.539* -0.210 
 (5.11) (5.18) (0.89) (3.47) (1.76) (0.66) 
U of Rochester 1.420*** 1.552*** 0.166 -0.163 -1.045*** -0.558* 
 (5.89) (5.74) (0.60) (0.29) (3.38) (1.65) 
U of Southern Calif. 0.293*** -0.437*** 0.031 -0.101 1.338*** -0.485 
 (2.69) (4.95) (0.15) (0.19) (3.97) (1.58) 
U of Texas -0.059 -0.138 -0.171 -0.631** -0.193 -0.180 
 (0.17) (0.47) (0.34) (2.35) (0.59) (0.32) 
U of Washington -0.600*** -0.501* -1.462*** 1.094 -0.036 -1.041 
 (2.95) (1.85) (4.15) (1.48) (0.04) (1.09) 
U of Wisconsin 0.316** -0.227 -0.676 0.687*** 0.060 0.497 
 (2.51) (1.09) (1.49) (3.32) (0.30) (1.63) 
Yale 1.029*** -0.028 -0.100 1.882*** 1.036*** -1.660*** 
 (3.35) (0.07) (0.26) (2.72) (3.56) (4.19) 
Significant (+) Count 17  9 2 16 10 4 
Significant (-) Count 5  4 9 3 6 7 
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Table 6: Change in Individual Adjusted Impact Productivity following Moves 
 
The transition matrix below presents the change in Individual Adjusted Impact Productivity around a move, 
where Individual Adjusted Impact Productivity is the residual of regressing impact productivity on rank, 
career years, career years squared, career years cubed, visiting, and editor impact. To construct the statistics 
below, we calculate the average of the two years of adjusted productivity following a move and subtract 
from it the average of the two years of adjusted productivity prior to the move. We exclude the move year 
in both pre- and post-measures. A move up is defined to be a move into a top 5 university by anyone or a 
move into a top 25 university by those from other school. The top 5 are chosen as those with the highest 
decade average individual productivity in the field. A lateral move is moving within the top 5, within the 
top 6-25 universities or within others. A move down is a move from top 5 to top 6-26 or from top 25 to 
others. The observation counts for moves in each category are given below the change in productivity. 
Asterisks *, **, and *** denote significance at a 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 
Assistant and Associate Professors 
 1970s 1980s 1990s 
Move Down 0.558 -0.806* 0.337 
 54 119 145 
           Lateral -0.795 -0.484 0.240 
 63 131 124 
           Up 2.013** 0.454 -0.254 
 31 75 60 
All Moves 0.287 -0.385 0.193 
 148 325 329 
Full Professors 
 1970s 1980s 1990s 
Move Down -1.008 -0.151 -0.692 
 37 104 123 
           Lateral -1.938** -0.493 -0.172 
 40 111 164 
           Up -0.067 1.326 -1.119* 
 28 66 95 
All Moves -1.112* 0.061 -0.575** 
 105 281 382 
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Table 7: Determinants of Faculty Productivity – Selection Model 
 
Panel A presents the logit estimation of the probability of moving as in equation (3) (i). The dependent variable is an 
indicator for a move. We estimate a fourth order polynomial of the individual’s age, calculated as the current year 
minus the undergraduate year plus 22. A likelihood ratio test (LRT) is given for testing joint relevance of the variables 
in estimating the probability of a move. 
 
Panel B presents the conditional logit selection estimation of the probability of being at a given location as in equation 
(3) (ii). The dependent variable is an indicator variable for the faculty being at the potential school for each year. Flight 
Time is the difference in flight times (expressed in 100s of minutes) to the origin home city, defined as the city of the 
undergraduate institution, from the prior year location and potential location. Prior Location is an indicator for the 
potential location being a different university than the university from the prior year. Not Prior Location = 1 – Prior 
Location, for convenience of interpretation. PhDSchool Location is an indicator for whether the potential school is the 
location of the individuals’ Ph.D. degree. It is allowed to equal 1 only for individuals whose prior year school is a top 5 
school and who have graduated from their Ph.D. program more than 2 years prior. Productivity distance is the 
difference between the individual’s two-prior-year average productivity and the potential locations’ average two prior 
year productivity. For assistant and associate professors, we take the absolute value of this number, as described in the 
text. Associate, Full, and Chaired are rank indicator variables. Robust standard errors are clustered at the school level. 
A Wald test statistic is provided for testing joint relevance of the variables in the estimation. 
 
Panels C and D present the estimation results from the second stage of the selection model. The only difference in these 
estimations from those of Table 5 is that the contrast matrix setting up the university fixed effects estimation has been 
replaced by the predicted probability of each individual being at each location, estimated in the conditional logit in step 
1. Impact productivity is the dependent variable and is measured as the count of AER equivalent pages written by each 
faculty in 41 economics and finance journals with each article multiplied by the decade impact factor of the journal 
published given in Table 2. Adjustment to AER equivalents normalizes by font, typesetting and average article length.  
Publication pages are divided by 1/n coauthors. The 1990s decade includes 2000 and 2001. Career years is the years 
since Ph.D. The model is fit with individual fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted to account for the first stage 
variance by bootstrapping the first stage, taking the variance of the predicted probabilities and adding the variance to 
the regression variance in the second stage following Petrin and Train (2001). In all panels, T-statistics are in 
parentheses.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 
 Panel A: First Stage – Selection to Move 
 
 Dependent variable: Indicator for Moves 
 Age 7.29*** 
  (7.89) 
 Age2 -0.23*** 
  (7.27) 
 Age3 (/1,000) 3.23*** 
  (6.63) 
 Age4 (/1,000,000) -16.37*** 
  (6.04) 
 Constant -84.83*** 
  (8.72) 
 Observations 35,993 
 Pseudo R-Square 0.037 




Panel B: First Stage – Selection among Potential Schools 
 
 Dependent variable: Indicator for each faculty being at each of 26 locations 
 Flight Time  0.223** 
  (2.01) 
 Prior Location 5.375*** 
  (27.58) 
 PhDSchool Location 1.122*** 
  (5.23) 
 PhDSchool Location * Non-Prior Location 1.614*** 
  (9.89) 
 Productivity Distance -0.065*** 
  (3.16) 
 Productivity Distance * Associate -0.021 
  (0.59) 
 Productivity Distance * Full -0.016 
  (0.23) 
 Productivity Distance * Chaired -0.118* 
  (1.71) 
 Observations 816,624 
 Pseudo R-Square 0.821 
 Wald Test Statistic for Relevance  42,415 








Panel C: Determinants of Faculty Productivity – Selection Model 
 
 Dependent variable: Impact Productivity 
 Career Years -0.222*** 
  (4.99) 
 Career Years^2 0.004* 
  (1.94) 
 Career Years^3 -0.048 
  (1.32) 
 Associate Professor -0.425*** 
  (2.77) 
 Full Professor -0.651*** 
  (3.18) 
 Chaired Full -0.855*** 
  (3.55) 
 Editor Impact -0.348 
  (0.94) 
 Visiting 0.022 
  (0.16) 
 Decade 1980s 0.704*** 
  (2.96) 
 Decade 1990s 1.100*** 
  (3.65) 
 Finance*Decade1970s -0.427 
  (0.35) 
 Finance*Decade1980s 0.060 
  (0.05) 
 Finance*Decade1990s 0.204 
  (0.19) 
 Constant 4.969*** 
  (12.60) 
 Observations 29,754 
 Individual Fixed Effects Yes 
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Panel D: University Fixed Effects across Decades and Field – Selection Model  
 
 Dependent Variable: Impact Productivity 
 Economics Departments Finance Departments 
  1970s 1980s 1990s 1970s 1980s 1990s 
Carnegie Mellon -34.81* 15.44 0.02 81.72*** -2.00 -20.78 
 (1.74) (1.46) 0.00  (2.64) (0.12) (1.18) 
Columbia 49.82*** -5.59 5.28 36.54 5.50 -0.17 
 (2.84) (0.63) (0.55) (1.57) (0.56) (0.02) 
Cornell 0.61 -3.88 6.30 -10.62 -32.49 -15.95 
 (0.05) (0.44) (0.52) (0.32) (1.20) (0.48) 
Duke -5.57 9.14 -5.29 21.82 27.62 23.29 
 (0.40) (0.86) (0.32) (0.56) (1.39) (1.27) 
Harvard 81.69*** 14.61** -18.66** -2.52 -21.89 -25.49 
 (6.31) (2.05) (2.34) (0.03) (1.18) (1.36) 
Indiana 29.26 11.80 8.52 24.94 -11.25 3.69 
 (1.44) (0.97) (0.49) (0.60) (0.65) (0.17) 
MIT 26.41*** 32.51*** -1.51 19.83 24.42 -3.59 
 (2.60) (3.87) (0.19) (0.82) (1.62) (0.23) 
NYU -17.31 -23.15** -25.90** 5.91 2.06 23.25* 
 (1.33) (2.43) (2.23) (0.31) (0.21) (1.91) 
Northwestern 6.71 14.31* 17.39* 12.07 7.73 -24.06** 
 (0.56) (1.79) (1.88) (0.59) (0.72) (2.01) 
Ohio State 50.32** -15.68 -47.57* 31.27 6.80 -7.19 
 (2.18) (0.99) (1.86) (0.87) (0.43) (0.28) 
Princeton 21.80** 30.98*** -14.22* -- -- -- 
 (1.96) (3.83) (1.74) -- -- -- 
Purdue 39.68 -27.50* -29.12 -9.49 -3.03 -23.52 
 (1.26) (1.72) (1.45) (0.33) (0.16) (1.03) 
Stanford 16.75 10.78 -10.62 11.68 30.47** -2.08 
 (1.45) (1.39) (1.00) (0.52) (2.27) (0.12) 
UBC 15.93 -19.89* -4.83 43.48 -4.12 -16.88 
 (1.12) (1.79) (0.36) (1.03) (0.28) (1.01) 
UC Berkeley 11.39 2.77 -13.31 -19.23 8.85 7.41 
 (0.96) (0.32) (1.36) (0.69) (0.52) (0.36) 
UCLA -14.06 9.52 6.48 40.20 18.95 12.01 
 (0.78) (0.71) (0.50) (1.25) (1.26) (0.66) 
U of Chicago 1.98 4.72 -11.82 21.16 19.14** -15.59 
 (0.18) (0.59) (1.34) (1.03) (2.10) (1.37) 
U of Michigan 4.96 27.73*** 26.81** -1.46 20.68* 3.25 
 (0.48) (2.93) (2.47) (0.04) (1.73) (0.27) 
U of Pennsylvania 25.36** 25.36*** 1.90 13.29 -11.77 -1.02 
 (2.17) (3.07) (0.21) (0.89) (1.31) (0.10) 
U of Rochester 21.84 29.65** -3.57 -29.69 -12.43 -5.16 
 (1.27) (2.42) (0.29) (1.30) (1.03) (0.34) 
USC -10.97 -21.11 -17.36 8.64 14.12 -15.06 
 (0.55) (1.38) (1.11) (0.25) (0.63) (0.80) 
U of Texas -19.79 -11.67 -16.52 -3.33 -3.34 6.60 
 (0.76) (0.69) (1.03) (0.17) (0.25) (0.31) 
U of Washington -9.13 -8.44 -22.44 5.58 6.46 -15.09 
 (0.57) (0.57) (1.25) (0.27) (0.42) (0.63) 
U of Wisconsin 7.94 -6.58 -6.71 84.26 4.68 25.17 
 (0.70) (0.77) (0.62) (1.20) (0.19) (1.27) 
Yale 2.92 -4.66 -12.01 144.10*** 38.30** -24.23 
 (0.29) (0.58) (1.32) (3.07) (2.44) (1.04) 
Significant (+) Count 6 7 2 2 4 1 
Significant (-) Count 1 2 4 0 0 1 
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Table 8: Determinants of Faculty Productivity & Team Externality 
 
Only two differences distinguish the regression from column 2 of Table 5. First, included is the variable team, 
calculated as the prior two year average productivity of all colleagues in one’ department who are productive for the 
years considered.  Second, all columns include individual fixed effects and university random effects. As before, 
observations are at the individual-year level. Impact productivity is measured as the count of AER equivalent pages 
written by each faculty in 41 economics and finance journals, normalized by font, typesetting and average article 
length, divided by 1/n coauthors and multiplied by the decade impact factor of the journal. Career years is the years 
since Ph.D. Associate and Full Professor, Chaired, and Visiting are indicator variables for the position of the faculty.  
Editor impact is the sum of the impact factors for the journals for which the faculty serves as an editor or co-editor.  T-
statistics are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
Dependent Variable: Impact Productivity 
Career Years -0.005 
 (0.13) 
Career Years^2 -0.006*** 
 (3.27) 
Career Years^3 (in 1,000s) 0.117*** 
 (3.42) 
Associate Professor -0.501*** 
 (3.09) 
Full Professor -0.914*** 
 (4.06) 
Chaired Full Professor -1.169*** 
 (4.90) 
Editor Impact 0.004 
 0.00  
Visiting 0.043 
 (0.56) 
Decade 1980s 0.310** 
 (2.45) 

















Individual Fixed Effects Yes 
University Random Effects Yes 
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Table 9: Decomposition of University Fixed Effects 
 
The dependent variable is the field-decade university fixed effects from the estimation of Table 8 in which the team 
externality effect has been removed. Deadwood is decade average of each year’s percentage of faculty who have not 
published an article in the prior two years. Editors In-House is the natural logarithm of the count of editors housed by 
the department for a year, averaged over the decade. Faculty Training Quality is the decade average percentage of 
faculty trained in top 5 schools, where the top 5 schools have the highest average productivity in the field for the 
decade. Ph.D. Program Quality is average number of students placed in top 25 universities from that department.  
Distance Metro is the natural log of the distance to the closest metropolitan area. State School is an indicator of whether 
the university is a public institution. Snowfall is the average snowfall in January for the university location.  T-statistics 
are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
Dependent Variable: University Fixed Effects Estimates 
 Economics Finance 
Editors In-House -0.109  -0.273**  
 (1.31)  (2.32)  
Editors In-House*Decade 1970s  0.422***  0.142 
  (3.66)  (0.48) 
Editors In-House *Decade 1980s  0.193*  -0.079 
  (1.84)  (0.49) 
Editors In-House *Decade 1990s  -0.106  -0.367** 
  (1.03)  (2.49) 
Faculty Training Quality 1.384* 0.925 -0.955 -0.943 
 (1.91) (1.58) (1.50) (1.48) 
Deadwood -1.975**  -3.404***  
 (2.26)  (5.66)  
Deadwood*1970s Decade  -0.776  -2.694*** 
  (1.01)  (4.05) 
Deadwood*1980s Decade  -1.242  -3.739*** 
  (1.59)  (4.89) 
Deadwood*1990s Decade  -1.299  -3.499*** 
  (1.49)  (5.18) 
Ph.D. Program Quality -0.083 -0.207* 0.195 0.326 
 (0.59) (1.77) (0.74) (1.26) 
Distance Metro 0.052 0.023 0.083 0.082 
 (0.95) (0.52) (1.20) (1.21) 
State School -0.079 0.138 -0.179 -0.061 
 (0.36) (0.77) (0.65) (0.23) 
Snowfall 0.001 0.004 -0.010 -0.012* 
 (0.11) (1.02) (1.53) (1.90) 
Constant 0.557 -0.008 2.337*** 2.196*** 
 (0.98) (0.02) (5.09) (4.85) 
Observations 75 75 72 72 
Decade Random Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Partial R-Square (Type III SSE)     
 Model (R-Squared) 0.21 0.53 0.42 0.50 
 Deadwood 0.06 0.02 0.29 0.27 
 Editors 0.02 0.16 0.05 0.06 
 Training of Faculty 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 Ph.D. Program 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 
 Metro Distance 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 State School 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Snow 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 
 Deadwood & Editors together 0.08 0.40 0.36 0.44 
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Table 10: Differences in Salaries SUR Estimation 
 
Salaries are the decade average university 9 or 10 month salaries as collected in the National Center of 
Education Statistics (HEGIS and IPEDS series) yearly survey broken down by assistant, associate and full 
professorship.  F.E.Impact is the estimated university fixed effects for economics departments by decade.  
F.E.Individual is the estimated individual fixed effects for economics departments by decade.  Differences 
are taken at the decade level.  The difference estimations are fitted using a seemingly unrelated regression 
to capture cross-equation correlation in the errors. Z-statistics are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The estimating equation is given by: 
 
itititt IndividualEFImpactEFSalary εβββ +∆+∆+=∆ .... 210  
 
  Coefficient  z-statistics 
                           Assistant Professors 
 ∆F.E.Impact -1,385.8 **    (2.23) 
 ∆F.E.Individual 267.4     (0.51) 
 Constant 18,739.5 ***  (28.44) 
 R-Squared 0.059   
 Observations 94   
     
                         Associate Professors 
 ∆F.E.Impact -1,749.5 ***    (2.45) 
 ∆F.E.Individual 262.1     (0.44) 
 Constant 21,201.7 ***   (28.01) 
 R-Squared 0.032   
 Observations 94   
     
                         Full Professors 
 ∆F.E.Impact -2,916.5 ***    (2.66) 
 ∆F.E.Individual 902.4     (0.98) 
 Constant 31,750.8 ***  (27.26) 
 R-Squared 0.091   
 Observations 94   
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Appendix 2 Panel A: Determinants of Faculty Productivity by Rank 
Observations are at the individual-year level. Impact and raw productivities are measured as the count of AER equivalent pages 
written by each faculty in 41 economics and finance journals. Adjustment to AER equivalents normalizes by font, typesetting and 
average article length.  Publication pages are divided by 1/n coauthors. Impact productivity multiplies each article by the decade 
impact factor of the journal published given in Table 2. Article count is the simple sum of articles published by year.  The 1990s 
decade includes 2000 and 2001. Career years is the years since Ph.D. Associate and Full Professor, Chaired, and Visiting are 
indicator variables for the position of the faculty.  Editor impact is the sum of the impact factors for the journals for which the faculty 
serves as an editor or co-editor.  All columns include individual fixed effects.  Columns 2, 4 and 6 add university-field fixed effects.  
Article counts are estimated with Poisson Regression.  T-statistics are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
Dependent Variable: Impact Productivity Raw Productivity Article Count 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Career Years -0.102*** -0.072* -0.100 -0.044 0.025*** 0.029*** 
 (2.63) (1.80) (1.31) (0.56) (4.08) (4.65) 
Career Years^2 -0.001 -0.004* -0.006 -0.010** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.72) (1.93) (1.53) (2.38) (10.10) (10.49) 
Career Years^3  (1,000s) 0.045 0.092*** 0.122* 0.198*** 0.056*** 0.061*** 
 (1.51) (2.68) (1.85) (2.63) (7.85) (8.28) 
Chaired Full Professor -0.282** -0.416*** -0.444** -0.696*** 0.050* -0.019 
 (2.27) (4.06) (2.50) (4.69) (1.87) (0.51) 
Editor Impact 0.092 0.077 0.046 0.060 0.050 0.023 
 (0.12) (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.87) (0.38) 
Visiting 0.032 0.037 0.162 0.142 0.053* 0.034 
 (0.37) (0.45) (0.93) (0.84) (1.85) (1.15) 
Decade 1980s 0.449** 0.725*** 1.265*** 1.986*** 0.078** 0.150*** 
 (2.32) (3.20) (3.72) (5.79) (1.99) (2.59) 
Decade 1990s 0.772*** 1.657*** 2.239*** 4.036*** 0.041 0.175** 
 (2.62) (3.15) (3.98) (4.69) (0.71) (2.36) 
Finance*Decade1970s -1.229** -1.327 -0.308 0.793 0.344* 0.497** 
 (2.12) (1.20) (0.32) (0.46) (1.70) (2.08) 
Finance*Decade1980s -1.150** -1.160 -0.921 -0.026 0.058 0.116 
 (2.36) (1.10) (1.07) (0.02) (0.29) (0.52) 
Finance*Decade1990s -1.166** -1.278 -1.717* -1.240 -0.150 -0.193 
 (2.36) (1.40) (1.85) (0.83) (0.75) (0.86) 
Full*Decade 1970s 0.203 0.684** 0.198 1.239*** -0.074 0.008 
 (0.77) (2.46) (0.35) (2.63) (1.62) (0.13) 
Full*Decade 1980s -0.436*** -0.115 -0.805** -0.245 -0.130*** -0.072 
 (2.60) (0.70) (2.44) (0.92) (3.55) (1.46) 
Full*Decade 1990s -0.824*** -0.623** -1.594*** -1.428*** -0.058 0.010 
 (2.69) (2.37) (3.41) (3.40) (1.45) (0.19) 
Full*Finance*1970s -0.037 0.079 -0.316 -0.802 -0.160* -0.374** 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.38) (0.59) (1.73) (2.33) 
Full*Finance*1980s 0.002 0.321 -0.127 0.176 -0.095 -0.076 
 (0.01) (0.74) (0.23) (0.25) (1.34) (0.79) 
Full*Finance*1990s 0.191 0.282 0.587 1.004 -0.023 0.006 
 (0.50) (0.73) (0.92) (1.61) (0.32) (0.08) 
Constant 4.607*** 3.821*** 7.640*** 5.671***   
 (12.36) (10.38) (11.00) (9.45)   
Observations 35,917 35,917 35,917 35,917 35,917 35,917 
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
University Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
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Appendix 2, Panel B: University Fixed Effects for Assistant & Associate Professors 
University fixed effects estimates for the impact productivity estimation from Appendix 2, Panel A, 
Column 2.   
 Dependent Variable: Impact Productivity 
 Economics Departments Finance Departments 
  1970s 1980s 1990s 1970s 1980s 1990s 
Carnegie Mellon -1.008** 0.272 0.338** 1.888*** -0.045 -1.432** 
 (2.23) (1.26) (2.14) (6.53) (0.09) (2.05) 
Columbia 1.676*** 0.123 -1.180** 1.328*** 0.096 -0.113 
 (6.45) (0.44) (2.41) (7.34) (0.44) (0.55) 
Cornell -0.261 -0.209 -0.448 0.393 -0.157 -0.580 
 (1.18) (0.68) (1.35) (1.13) (0.65) (1.31) 
Duke -0.604*** 1.099*** -0.532** -0.830*** 0.461 0.848** 
 (3.27) (4.21) (2.35) (3.51) (1.64) (2.43) 
Harvard 2.012*** 0.548** -1.284*** -1.640*** -1.498** -2.762** 
 (10.40) (2.25) (4.05) (3.22) (2.38) (2.00) 
Indiana 1.492*** 0.732*** -0.052 2.165*** -0.869*** 0.439*** 
 (7.55) (4.09) (0.21) (8.85) (2.58) (2.77) 
MIT 0.488* 0.957*** -0.780*** 1.989*** 2.366 -0.029 
 (1.84) (3.75) (2.59) (2.61) (1.63) (0.05) 
New York U 0.331 -0.374 -0.021 1.639*** 0.613 2.047*** 
 (1.06) (0.80) (0.04) (6.66) (1.51) (9.02) 
Northwestern 0.920*** 2.252*** -0.343 0.884* 1.097*** -0.237 
 (5.08) (15.09) (1.17) (1.95) (4.05) (0.70) 
Ohio State U 1.551*** 0.358 0.758** 2.498*** 0.543*** -0.653 
 (7.95) (1.64) (1.97) (9.77) (3.08) (1.37) 
Princeton 1.064*** 2.573*** 0.513    
 (3.50) (7.97) (0.98)    
Purdue 0.161 -0.954*** -0.992*** 0.629 1.483*** 0.554 
 (0.27) (5.74) (2.77) (1.48) (2.93) (1.10) 
Stanford 1.771*** 1.240*** -0.405 1.129*** 3.932*** 0.649 
 (9.86) (5.58) (1.03) (4.41) (12.28) (1.05) 
U British Columbia 0.954*** 0.117 0.703** 2.945** 0.247 0.266 
 (3.78) (0.51) (2.15) (2.43) (1.23) (0.81) 
UC Berkeley -0.399** 0.305 -0.667 0.309 0.602 -0.641 
 (2.45) (1.20) (1.64) (0.81) (1.61) (1.51) 
UC Los Angeles 2.110*** -0.256 -0.707 2.268*** 1.521*** -0.522 
 (6.27) (0.62) (1.49) (14.13) (3.83) (1.16) 
U of Chicago 2.470*** 0.881*** -0.210 2.709*** 2.063*** -0.262 
 (11.33) (4.00) (0.71) (9.02) (8.40) (0.69) 
U of Michigan 1.301*** 1.828*** 0.063 1.832*** 1.201*** -0.196 
 (5.88) (5.16) (0.24) (4.10) (2.81) (0.78) 
U of Pennsylvania 1.366*** 1.063*** -0.287 0.728*** -0.393 -0.173 
 (4.97) (6.28) (1.25) (4.54) (1.55) (0.65) 
U of Rochester 0.411 1.569*** 0.914*** -0.469 -1.410*** 0.380 
 (1.23) (5.28) (2.99) (0.92) (4.88) (0.98) 
U of Southern Calif. 0.428** -0.313 0.338 0.460 1.513*** -0.471 
 (2.43) (1.59) (1.15) (0.75) (4.48) (1.41) 
U of Texas 1.330*** -0.355 0.255 -0.369 0.023 -0.396 
 (4.44) (1.53) (0.41) (1.17) (0.09) (0.54) 
U of Washington 0.142 -0.237 -2.093*** 1.110** 1.062 -1.071 
 (0.39) (0.77) (5.59) (1.99) (1.08) (0.95) 
U of Wisconsin 0.784*** -0.299 -0.541 -0.270 0.593*** 0.654* 
 (4.94) (1.19) (1.23) (0.52) (3.32) (1.96) 
Yale 1.987*** -0.305 0.395 3.573*** 0.744* -1.763*** 
 (7.08) (0.80) (1.06) (7.61) (1.86) (3.95) 
Significant (+) Count 17  11 4 15 10 4 
Significant (-) Count 3  1 6 2 3 3 
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Appendix 2, Panel C: University Fixed Effects for Full Professors 
University fixed effects estimates for the impact productivity estimation from Appendix 2, Panel A, 
Column 2.  
 
 Dependent Variable: Impact Productivity 
 Economics Departments Finance Departments 
  1970s 1980s 1990s 1970s 1980s 1990s 
Carnegie Mellon -1.080*** 1.276*** -0.513  3.250*** -1.431* 
 (3.90) (5.06) (1.50)  (4.79) (1.71) 
Columbia -0.066 -0.281 0.100 0.494 -1.003*** -0.756** 
 (0.16) (0.47) (0.25) (0.85) (2.79) (2.28) 
Cornell -0.410 -0.504 -0.025 -2.157*** -2.064*** -0.679** 
 (0.92) (0.83) (0.05) (5.12) (11.05) (2.51) 
Duke -0.521* -0.540** -0.746***  -2.329*** -2.094*** 
 (1.84) (2.24) (2.93)  (5.19) (6.88) 
Harvard 2.394*** 0.218 -2.248*** -3.889*** -3.497*** -1.752** 
 (10.11) (0.82) (6.07) (4.80) (4.64) (2.32) 
Indiana -1.117*** 0.351 -0.109 -0.808*** -1.026*** -0.808*** 
 (3.46) (1.18) (0.33) (4.72) (3.28) (4.72) 
MIT 0.912*** 0.177 -1.569*** 0.101 -1.049 -0.512 
 (4.04) (0.65) (3.34) (0.09) (0.93) (0.65) 
New York U -1.474*** -0.589 -0.459 0.019 -0.440** -0.444*** 
 (2.66) (0.86) (0.74) (0.04) (2.49) (2.67) 
Northwestern 0.347 0.480 1.273*** -0.465 0.021 0.200 
 (1.06) (1.41) (2.66) (1.11) (0.08) (0.70) 
Ohio State U 1.771*** -0.978** -2.001** 1.565* -2.291* 0.369 
 (4.16) (2.16) (2.42) (1.85) (1.71) (0.13) 
Princeton 0.669** 0.228 -1.592***    
 (2.42) (0.55) (3.99)    
Purdue -0.423 -0.084 -0.587 3.030*** 3.234*** -0.898 
 (1.06) (0.15) (1.51) (7.16) (3.30) (0.33) 
Stanford 0.204 -0.819** -1.824*** 1.056* 0.552 2.712*** 
 (0.73) (2.42) (5.47) (1.71) (1.20) (5.23) 
U British Columbia -0.265 0.043 0.152 1.472 0.806 1.472 
 (0.70) (0.11) (0.59) (1.23) (0.69) (1.23) 
UC Berkeley -0.702* -0.400* -0.914*** -0.059 -3.081*** 1.795*** 
 (1.94) (1.69) (4.23) (0.10) (4.94) (3.30) 
UC Los Angeles 0.896 1.099* -0.152 1.446** -1.148* 1.408*** 
 (1.28) (1.93) (0.43) (2.35) (1.75) (4.07) 
U of Chicago 0.580** 0.653*** -0.257 1.472*** -0.105 -0.766* 
 (2.13) (2.73) (1.10) (2.98) (0.20) (1.70) 
U of Michigan 0.020 0.630*** 0.459** 1.239*** 1.553*** -2.633*** 
 (0.09) (2.70) (2.15) (3.27) (6.43) (7.26) 
U of Pennsylvania 0.869** 0.779** 0.170 0.261 -0.170 0.522 
 (2.44) (2.28) (1.00) (1.20) (0.41) (1.31) 
U of Rochester 2.084*** 2.203*** -0.789** 1.975** 0.427 -1.804*** 
 (7.46) (9.42) (2.14) (2.09) (0.60) (6.03) 
U of Southern Calif. 0.060 -0.408*** -0.114 -1.180* -0.722*** -0.722*** 
 (0.24) (2.67) (0.45) (1.95) (2.84) (2.84) 
U of Texas -1.506** -0.184 -0.644 -1.395** -0.607 0.158 
 (2.50) (0.33) (1.06) (2.15) (1.33) (0.39) 
U of Washington -1.452*** -0.482 -0.757** -0.211 -1.369 -1.123 
 (3.45) (0.99) (2.09) (0.16) (1.19) (1.24) 
U of Wisconsin -0.314* -0.114 -0.550 1.088*** -0.390 0.721*** 
 (1.75) (0.65) (1.39) (2.80) (1.21) (3.00) 
Yale -1.745*** -0.117 -1.092** -1.863*** 1.798*** -0.853 
 (3.61) (0.22) (2.23) (3.99) (2.78) (1.10) 
Significant (+) Count 7  6 2 8 4 4 
Significant (-) Count 9  5 10 6 9 12 
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